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With this report on the forest sector institutions in Arkhangelsk Oblast the second study
in a series of case studies that IIASA has initiated in different regions of the Russian
Federation is completed. The first study was conducted in Tomsk Oblast and was
reported in IR-98-027 Carlsson and Olsson (eds.) 1998; IR-98-084 Carlsson and Olsson,
1998; IR-99-010 Carlsson, Lundgren and Olsson, 1999. Studies are currently being
conducted in the Karelian Republic as well as in the regions of Moscow, Murmansk,
Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk. All these studies deal with institutional aspects
of the Russian forest sector.
The research has been made possible through generous financial support from the
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1. Introduction
The working hypotheses for this study can be summarized in two statements:
1) The restructuring of the Russian economy can hardly be successful
without fully integrating the forest sector.
2) The abundant Russian forests cannot be regarded as a “resource” in an
economic sense without the establishment of a suitable institutional
framework.
Starting with the latter statement, trees and forests are not an economic resource just
as they stand out there in nature. All types of forest use require regulatory systems to
constrain the activities of those who use the resource, and, correspondingly, without
any regulating mechanisms we can hardly claim that a particular forest is a
“resource,” neither in an economic sense nor in the sense of representing a use value.
As we shall see, the mechanisms regulating the forest use in Russia today is largely
deficient or malfunctioning. Thus, as a matter of fact, today the Russian forest sector
does not represent such a huge and important economic resource as is often claimed.
Statements about Russia’s huge forest “resources” that are commonly heard rather
reflect the fact that Russia within its territory holds an immense area covered with
forests, which, under certain favorable conditions, might generate income and
welfare. Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that the Russian territory holds an
asset in the form of forests that doubtlessly has the “potential” of serving as a resource
for the creation of welfare among the people. But, this is not the same as to equalize
the existence of a large forest fund with resource abundance.
Contemporary research indicates that the wood supply from traditional suppliers will
probably decline. Russian forests are underexploited and have the potential to fill the
expected supply gap (World Bank, 1997:44). Whether they will actually be able to do
so or not is, however, primarily depending on whether adequate institutional
arrangements will be developed in order to smoothen the entrance of the Russian
forest sector on this new market. In this context it is important to emphasize that
2institutional arrangements are not primarily to be understood as formal organizations
and formally written laws and regulations. Institutions are “the rules of the game”
(North, 1990), i.e., those formal or informal rules that are de facto used by a set of
actors. With Pejovich (1998:23) institutions can be defined “as the legal,
administrative and customary arrangements for repeated human interactions. Their
major function is to enhance the predictability of human behavior. The prevailing
institutional framework in a society consists of formal and informal rules” (emphasis
in original). Such an institutional framework, well functioning, is a basic prerequisite
for the future development of Russian forestry. Logically, a poorly governed Russian
forest sector will be a severe obstacle for the transition to a market economy.
The aim of this project is to describe and analyze the current institutional framework
of the Russian forest sector. This is done through a series of case studies in several
Russian regions. In this report we present the results of a study in the Arkhangelsk
region in northern Russia. (See map on p. 27.)
Historically, Arkhangelsk has been one of Russia’s most important forest regions.
Therefore, what happens within the forest sector in this region will presumably mirror
a broader set of problems and possibilities related to the current state of economic
transition. Arkhangelsk has been selected as one among a number of case studies, the
common goal of which is to provide knowledge and insights based on regional
experiences that may be useful for policy making ultimately aimed at an institutional
restructuring of the Russian forest sector. The knowledge and analyses that these case
studies contribute may constitute an intellectual foundation for a series of policy
exercises (Duinker, 1997) with federal, regional and other stakeholders in the Russian
forest sector. In this way, the result of the research will hopefully make an impact on
the development of a modern Russian forest policy.
The Structure of the Report
The report consists of eight chapters structured in the following way. In the next
section of this introductory chapter the logic and methodology of the study are
outlined. In the second chapter we will depict the structure and distribution of the
forest resources in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Since plenty of good information about the
forest resources can be acquired by consulting the results of a number of studies
specifically conducted for analyzing such matters, the description made here is rather
broad and sketchy. The primary purpose of the description is to establish a general
foundation for the discussion in the following eight chapters in which we mainly
concentrate on institutional questions.
In the third chapter, the socioeconomic characteristics of the region are analyzed.
Here the main objective is to clarify to what extent the Arkhangelsk region differs
form other regions of the Russian Federation. For example, is the population of
Arkhangelsk more educated than the inhabitants in other regions, are they older,
healthier, and so forth? Presumably such socio-economic qualities are important
prerequisites for successfully developing the forest sector.
The fourth chapter focuses on institutional aspects. Starting with a short summary of
the organization of the forest sector in the Soviet system it is described to what extent,
and how, it has changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this chapter we also
try to clarify the actual configuration of the Arkhangelsk forest sector.
3In the fifth chapter, “The Political Profile and the Forest Sector” the political situation
in the oblast and the relation between political arenas and the forest sector is
discussed.
In the sixth chapter “Forest Enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast,” we give an overview
of how forest enterprises are organized in terms of holding companies, export
organizations, etc. We also discuss a number of typical problems within the sector and
how authorities have tried to solve these problems.
The seventh chapter of the report contains the results from a survey among forest
sector enterprises in Arkhangelsk. The chapter is aimed at clarifying to what extent
previously discussed features and shortcomings in the forest sector are reflected in the
behavior of the single firms.
In the eighth and final chapter, “Conclusion and Recommendations,” a number of
features are discussed that we found during the course of the study and that can be
regarded as obstacles for a successful modification of the forest sector. The basic
principles for identifying and evaluating whether or not a feature is to be regarded as a
“problem” or an “obstacle” are described more thoroughly in the subsequent
methodology section of the present chapter. It turns out that some of the problems
(and advantages) connected to the organization of the Arkhangelsk forest sector are
due to specific regional ways of handling things while others might be attributed to a
more general set of problems related to the present transition period. The report ends
by a number of suggestions on how to improve the development of the forest sector.
To achieve an ordered and carefully considered transformation of the old Soviet
system is a tremendous task forcing the Russian people to simultaneously grapple
with three problems: 1) economic restructuring, 2) state-building, and finally, 3)
nation-building, i.e., to establish Russia as a nation (Breslauer, 1995). In our report
these more general issues are discussed only when they coincide with, or assist, our
analysis of the Arkhangelsk forest sector. Albeit these three tasks are, indeed,
intertwined with regional problems the present report mainly deals with the forest
sector of Arkhangelsk, not with the general question of restructuring the entire
society.
The point of departure for the discussion in the final chapter is that changing the
forest sector is basically a matter for the Russians themselves to handle and our aim is
by no means to provide ready-made solutions to the great number of problems that
currently besets the sector. Nevertheless, the report is aimed at contributing results
and arguments useful for a wide circle of stakeholders within the Russian forest
sector, and especially for those who are particularly interested in the future of the
sector in Arkhangelsk Oblast.
Methodology
Studying institutional aspects of the Russian forest sector requires a methodology
suitable for investigating the sets of rules that govern the actors involved. In the case
of Arkhangelsk, a basic question to be addressed is what types of rules and norms do
actually guide the activities in the regional forest sector. Thus, the question is not how
these actors supposedly behave (or should behave) according to some formal
regulation, such as the Russian forest code.
In order to design the case study we have taken the Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework (IAD) as a point of departure. The IAD framework is a
4thoroughly tested tool for institutional analysis (Oakerson, 1992; E. Ostrom, 1995,
Ostrom et al., 1994; Sabatier, 1991; Thomson, 1992; Bogason, 1994). This
framework is sufficiently broad to be compatible with a wide range of theories, such
as, collective action theory, transaction cost theory, game theory, and constitutional
choice theory. The framework is described in detail elsewhere and will only be briefly
outlined here with special emphasis on how we use it as an analytical tool. (For a
comparison with other frameworks, see Sabatier, 1991 and Sproule-Jones, 1993.)
The focal point of the IAD framework is a specific action arena (cf. Fig. 1:1), in this
case the Arkhangelsk forest sector.
Action arenas are supposedly composed of two clusters of variables: 1) an action
situation involving participants, positions, actions, information, etc., and 2) actors
who have preferences, information-processing capabilities, and so forth (Ostrom, et
al., 1994:29 ff.).
The IAD framework seeks to understand action arenas with reference to three
“factors:” attributes of the physical world, attributes of community, and rules-in-use.
All together, this constitutes a complex set of relations that can be observed as pat-
terns of interaction. Thus, it can be assumed that physical attributes, such as the
structure and amount of forests in Arkhangelsk, affect the forest sector – our action
arena – in particular ways. Similarly, a number of attributes of the Arkhangelsk
“community” (the second box in the framework), such as people’s level of education,
their skills, habits, and norms, will affect activities performed within the sector.
Attributes of
Physical World
Attributes of
Community
Rules-in-Use
Action Arena
Action
Situations
Actors
Patterns of
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
Criteria
Figure 1:1. A framework for institutional analysis (Source: Ostrom et al., 1994:37)
In this way the IAD framework enables us to capture both social and political order,
i.e., to reveal how and why various actors organize their relations to the forest sector
in the way that they do. All together, these activities generate specific outcomes, and
by applying a number of evaluative criteria, such as economic efficiency, fiscal
equivalence, and equity, these outcomes can be assessed. In this study of the
Arkhangelsk forest sector a set of rather general criteria is applied.
5The arguments for this choice are the following. One should not expect that the
Russian forest sector can – or ought to – be changed in accordance with any blueprint
provided, for instance, by the forest sector in various western countries. Nevertheless,
assessing whether the development is for the “better” or the “worse” will require
some evaluation criteria. Since it would be presumptuous to judge Russia simply by
comparing it to the situation in western countries the evaluation criteria that are
applied in this study are more of a “baseline principles” type. Thus, we assume that a
specific institutional configuration is conducive to a sustainable Russian forest sector
and useful for the whole economy if the following conditions are met:
• Constitutional rules are acknowledged and transparent.
• The structure of property rights is settled and well defined, i.e., private actors can
acquire property or get the right to utilize property for their own benefit.
• Rules and regulations from official authorities are regarded as legitimate, and
apply equally to similar actors.
• The market decides prices of property and goods.
• Decision-making regarding collective choice and operational rules is
decentralized.
• Private investors can realize the returns on their investments.
• Rules are enacted aimed at preventing the devastation of natural resources.
• Legitimate authorities take measures against violations of rules.
However, it is unlikely that unambiguous statements can be made whether or not
individual conditions are really met. Using them for assessing the institutions
embedding the forest sector of Arkhangelsk is more a matter of discretion. Thus, in
this report the listed criteria are looked upon as devices that indicate how close to an
ideal the forest sector has developed.
Data Collection
The guiding principle for the collection of data has been the idea of  “tracing the
timber from the forest to the market.” For every link in this “forest-to-market chain”
we concentrate on the various kinds of institutional features that affect the actors
involved. The bulk of data that has been collected can be divided into four types:
I) The first kind of information concerns the socio-economic situation of the
Arkhangelsk Oblast, its economic geography as well as the formal political,
administrative structure that relates to the forest sector. Here the IIASA Russian Forest
Study Database1 as well as a number of secondary sources have been used.
II) The second type of information consists of forest data. Likewise, for the gathering
of this type of data, a number of secondary sources have been consulted. The data
have been supplemented with information from the IIASA database.
III) The third type of data is supposed to depict the formal as well as informal
institutional configuration of the Arkhangelsk forest sector. Here information has
                                                
1
 See description of the IIASA Russian Forest Study Database published on internet at URL:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/dbdoc
6been gathered during field visits and with the help of local collaborators who have
collected information according to a specific instruction developed within the project
(cf. Appendix 1:1).
IV) Finally, interviews have been conducted with management representatives of 25
enterprises in the Arkhangelsk region (cf. Appendix 1:2). Since the forest sector
consists of many sub-sectors and branches the selection of the enterprises has been
guided by the idea that the total series of interviews should reflect different aspects of
the sector. Thus, the interviewed enterprises are selected in order to cover the whole
“forest-to-market chain” (cf. Fig. 1:2). We have also deliberately incorporated both
small and large companies, new enterprises as well as old, consultants as well as
processing enterprises, and so forth. Accordingly, conclusions solely based on these
interviews can only be generalized to the interviewed enterprises themselves.
However, by adding this information to the broader set of data described above, we
assume the results of our analysis to be relevant for the regional forest sector as a
whole.
RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY HARVESTING PROCESSING AND MANUFACTURING
Figure 1:2. The action arena of the Arkhangelsk forest sector, the focus of the study
We now turn to report the results of our study of the Arkhangelsk forest sector. Here
we will consult and “unpack” the analytical framework described above. In the next
chapter we will describe some of the “physical attributes” of Arkhangelsk Oblast and,
in particular, its forest resources.
72. The Resource Base – Forests and the Forest Sector
in Arkhangelsk Oblast
At the beginning of the 20th century Arkhangelsk was the most populated area in the
circumpolar north. In 1926, the region had 429 thousand inhabitants. Still today, with
its 1.5 million inhabitants and 587.4 thousand km2, Arkhangelsk is one of the largest
administrative units in this part of the world. In 1937, it got the status of an oblast
(Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997). During the Stalin period Arkhangelsk became an
important area in the system of prison camps (the Gulag) that was developed. The
deportation of prisoners increased the population even further. Still there exist prison
camps, for example in Plesetsk, where prisoners are occupied with forest work
(Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:61).
Within the territory of Arkhangelsk we find three large areas which have a special
status. Like Arkhangelsk Oblast the Nenets Autonomous Okrug is regarded as a
“subject of the Russian federation” and the large islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz
Josef Land are in practice controlled by the military authorities.2 The Nenets
Autonomous Okrug has around 50,000 inhabitants.
For a long time Arkhangelsk Oblast has been one of Russia’s most important forest
areas. By the turn of the century Arkhangelsk was the center for the timber trade in
northern Russia (Björklund, 1994). This has not changed during the present era of
transition. Still in 1993, the region ranked second of all Russian regions in terms of
output from the forest sector (Granåsen et al., 1997:110). Out of a total area of 58.7
million hectares 29.3 million (50%) belongs to the so-called “state forest fund”
(Goslesfond).
Table 2:1. Forest resources in Arkhangelsk, area totals and growing stock, 1993.3
Forest Resources Managed by FFS All Areas
Forest fund (mill. ha) 27.4 29.3
Forested area (mill. ha) 19.9 21.6
Growing stock (mill. m3) 2150.6 2392.1
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database
According to the group classification system used in Russia since 1947, this fund is
distributed as follows (Table 2:2).
                                                
2
 The regional authorities attempted to gain control but were turned down through a presidential decree
of March 1992 (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:9).
3
 The result of the 1998 Forest State Account have not yet been published.
8Table 2:2. Distribution of the forest fund in Arkhangelsk by group classification and
land user (100 ha), 1993.
Land owner Group I Group II Group III
Arkhangelsk Forest Management 70222 0 204148
Forest industry 0 0 0
Environmental protection agency 412 0 0
Agricultural cooperatives 4975 2699 9838
Hunting cooperatives 0 0 0
Other federal organizations 25 0 218
Other 45 0 0
Total 75679 2699 214204
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database.
Basically, Group I forests consist of lands that are set aside for non-industrial use,
such as specially protected forests, municipal forests, parks, etc. The second group,
Group II, consists of lands in densely populated areas with scarce forest resources in
which forests must be especially protected. Group III, finally, consists of forests with
a significant industrial potential. In Arkhangelsk the majority of the forests belong to
the third group. The percentage distribution among the groups is 26, 1 and 73 percent
respectively. It must emphasized, however, that the entire forest fund is not forested.
Bogs, pastures, etc., are also incorporated in the fund. In total these non-forested areas
comprise 24percent of the forest fund in Arkhangelsk (VNIITslesresurs, 1995:18).
In Arkhangelsk Oblast, as in the rest of the Russian Federation, virtually no forest
land has been privatized. As can be seen in Table 2:1 and Table 2:2, the Federal
Forest Service (FFS) through its regional organization, the Arkhangelsk Forest
Management, owns the main part of the forest fund. The responsibility for the
management of this fund is divided among 28 state enterprises (leskhozy), each one
responsible for a specific area. Only two of these leskhozy lack industrial (Group 3)
forests on their lands. There is also a national park, Kenozersky, occupying 138,000
ha of land.
Species Composition
Along with the Komi Republic Arkhangelsk possesses the largest amount of
exploitable forests in north-western Russia. Around 50 percent of the area is regarded
as pre-tundra or northern taiga (Strakhov et al., 1996:15). Accordingly, we have a
predominance of spruce, pine and birch (listed in order of importance). As can be seen
in Table 2:3 and Diagram 2:1 a significant part of the forest fund in Arkhangelsk
consists of spruce (65%). Spruce and pine dominate the total forest stands (65% and
25% respectively) while birch and aspen occupy a minor part of the area and they also
comprise a minor part of the growing stock.
9Table 2:3. Species composition in Arkhangelsk in 1993. Arkhangelsk compared to the
rest of North-West Russia for forests managed by the Federal Forest Service of the
Russian Federation. (Percent of forested area and percent of growing stock.)
North-West
Russia Arkhangelsk Vologda Murmansk Komi KareliaSpecies
Area Stock-
ing
Area Stock-
ing
Area Stock-
ing
Area Stock-
ing
Area Stock-
ing
Area Stock-
ing
Pine 31,99 28,61 27,20 25,22 24,99 24,55 43,33 44,53 24,94 22,56 64,0 58,3
Spruce 47,96 54,13 56,91 65,33 29,67 31,07 30,45 41,68 56,21 60,91 25,6 32,0
Fir 0,22 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,54 0,66 0,0 0,0
Larch 0,37 0,47 0,28 0,42 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,69 0,82 0,0 0,0
Birch 17,30 13,31 14,55 7,81 37,14 35,36 26,19 13,78 15,29 11,35 9,7 8,8
Aspen 2,16 3,22 1,06 1,22 8,18 9,00 0,01 0,01 2,33 3,71 0,7 0,9
100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,0 100,0
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database
This can be compared to Siberia where the growing stock to a greater extent consists
of birch and aspen. During a period of more than twenty years, until 1989, only 29
percent of the clear-cut areas in Arkhangelsk were artificially regenerated. Today,
more than 95 percent of these regenerated areas are dominated by Scots pine
(Strakhov et al., 1996:34–35).
Diagram 2:1 Species composition of the forest fund in Arkhangelsk Oblast (Percent).
(Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database)
Strakhov et al. (1996) report that for a long period of time there has been a substantial
overcutting in many regions in North-West Russia. In Arkhangelsk this has been the
case in around half the number of leskhozy. In combination with the established
harvesting practice this has caused notable changes in the age distribution and a
following reduction of the forest productivity. During the last forty years the forest
resources have been diminished by 25 percent (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:63). In
addition, the predominant utilization of clearcutting in combination with poor
Standing StockForested Area
Birch
14.6%
Aspen
1.1%Larch
0.3%
Fir
0.0%
Spruce
56.9%
Spruce
65.3%
Pine
27.2% Pine
25.2%
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1.2%
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0.4%
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technology, inadequate skills, and lack of means of implementing forest laws have
caused major inefficiencies. For example, in 1994 between 2.1 and 2.6 million m3 of
harvested timber in the oblast were left on the harvesting sites (Strakhov et al.,
1996:76; 84).
The custom of clear-cutting in combination with poor regeneration programs was –
and still is – governed by the desire of getting cheap raw material neglecting the fact
that forest resources are exhaustible (Barr & Braden, 1988). As has been reported for
West Siberia and many other Russian regions (Carlsson & Olsson, 1998) such a
systematic over-cut has also taken place in Arkhangelsk, mainly along the most
important transport lines, railways and rivers. However, here this type of local over-
harvesting has been “compensated” and thereby hidden by an undercutting in other
areas. In 1981, and despite criticism from forest researchers and others, the
overcutting became “legalized” as a result of a decision to raise the Annual Allowable
Cut (AAC) to 28.8 million m3 (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:65). The habit of
overcutting is not unique. Based on estimates made for a number of areas, Pisarenko
and Strakhov (1996:29, 43) concluded that overharvesting in Russia has led to a
depletion of forests in the European part of Russia. In their sample of enterprises and
regions actually harvested volumes exceeded the AAC by around 35 percent.
However, reflecting the general decline within the Russian forest sector harvesting
has been significantly reduced in Arkhangelsk as well. When the general level of
harvesting declines so does clear-cutting, but, unlike Tomsk, for instance (cf. Carlsson
& Olsson, 1998), Arkhangelsk has not increased the proportion of regenerated areas;
it is still around 50 percent of the clear-cut areas (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:33).
Harvesting
The harvesting in Arkhangelsk reached a peek in 1987/88 with a total volume of
around 25 million m3. Since then, harvesting has decreased significantly and in 1996,
it was only about 29 percent of the 1988 level. Between 1990 and 1996 the production
of commercial wood dropped from 19.4 to 7.2 million m3 (Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1997).
Already in 1992 the production fell below the level of 1940 (Goskomstat
Arkhangelsk, 1997)! Earlier, harvesting volumes in Arkhangelsk were close to the
Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), but currently the level of harvesting is only 38 percent
of an AAC volume of 21.3 million m3 (Arkhangelsk Forest Management, 1996;
Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1997).
Although the proportion of mature and overmature forests stands has been reduced
with 30 percent since the 1950s, still 59 percent of the area is covered with this type
of trees (Strakhov et al., 1996:19). In combination with a rather low degree of
regeneration this has caused changes in the species composition resulting basically in
an increased inflow of birch and aspen. However, these changes are said to be hidden
in the statistics by the habit of regarding stands as coniferous even though they might
be comprised of only 30 percent of such species (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:63).
At the same time as overmature forests are less productive they are also the most
densely stocked. This provides an incentive to continue to harvest the most pristine
forests. However, since overmature forests are more exposed to pests, diseases, and
forest fires causing significant environmental and economic losses all over Russia, it
might anyway be rational in a sustainable forest management perspective to allow a
certain harvesting of these areas (Kiseleva, 1996).
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The Forest Sector in the Economy of Arkhangelsk Oblast
Although Arkhangelsk might earlier have been important for the Soviet economy,
nowadays the oblast plays a less important role in the Russian economy. It accounts
for only 0.8 percent of the Russian national income. For the entire Northern Region
the corresponding figure is 4.9 percent. The per capita national income for
Arkhangelsk is 23 percent lower than the Russian average. In the Northern Region the
Republic of Karelia comes closest with a per capita national income which is 6
percent higher than the average for Russia (Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996:60).
About 718,600 people constituted the economically active population in Arkhangelsk
in 1995. (At the end of 1997 this figure was 702,000 according to Goskomstat
Arkhangelsk, 1998:141.) This means a labor force participation rate of approximately
80 percent4, a figure which is significantly lower than the 1995 Russian average which
was 87 percent (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997; Goskomstat Rossii, 1996). In
Arkhangelsk Oblast 28% of the employed are working in Industry, 6.8% work in
Agriculture and Forestry, 6.5% in Construction, 12.5% in Transport and
Communications, 10.2% in Trade and Public Catering. The remaining 35.6% work in
various other service sectors like Culture, Health, Education and Banking
(Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997).
Diagram 2:2 illustrates the relative change in employment among different sectors of
the economy. It can be seen that mainly “Industry” but also “Agriculture & Forestry”,
“Construction” and “Transport & Communications” have experienced a decline. Not
unexpectedly, “Trade”, “Housing” and “Other” branches have increased their share of
total employment.
Diagram 2:2 Relative change in employment in Arkhangelsk Oblast between 1980
and 1996, In percent of total employment. (Source: Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1997.)
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 The labor force participation rate is equal to the economically active population in percent of the total
population in the relevant age groups.
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While “Electric Power” and “Fuel” together more than doubled its share of the
regional industrial output between 1992 and 1996 (from 11.8 to 24.4%), the “Machine
and Machine building” sector experienced a drastic decrease in relative importance.
Its output share fell from about 25 to 7 percent between 1991 and 1995. The “Food”
sector also experienced a drastic decline in relative importance. From a share of
around 15 percent in 1991 and 1992 it at first increased but then decreased its relative
importance and, in 1997, food production made up less than 8 percent of total regional
industrial output. The “Wood, Cellulose and Paper” branch had a high share of total
regional industrial production throughout the period. It stayed between about 40 and
53 percent with peaks in 1992 and 1995 and troughs in 1991 and 1996. In 1997 its
share of total industrial production was 45.8 percent.
Table 2:4. Industrial output in Arkhangelsk, share of various branches 1991–1996,
percent.
Branch of industry 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Electric power generation 3.7 8.2 10.0 11.8 12.3 19.2 18.1
Fuel 2.4 3.6 3.9 5.2 9.4 5.2 5.6
Ferrous metals 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.6
Non-ferrous metals 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Chemical 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Machine and machine
building 26.5 10.3 14.1 11.0 7.7 N/A N/A
Wood, cellulose and paper 39.5 52.0 42.3 46.9 53.4 40.6 45.8
Building materials 4.3 3.6 3.9 3.6 2.9 2.3 2.0
Glass and ceramic 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - -
Light industry 4.8 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.8
Food 14.6 15.3 17.8 15.0 10.2 9.0 7.8
Flour grinding and mixed
fodder 1.7 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.2
Source: For 1991-1993: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database; For 1994: Bradshaw & Palacin,
1996:71; For 1995: Goskomstat 1996:970-71. For 1996: Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1996:15; For 1997
Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1998:17
The forest sector, ship building, fishing, oil, diamonds, and space research are the
most important branches of the Arkhangelsk economy. However, the forest sector
constitutes the backbone of the regional economy. In 1995, it contributed about 48
percent of the total production volume in the region. In 1996, this share came down to
36 percent (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1996:18). The share of the population in
working age that is in one way or another engaged in activities related to the forest
sector has been estimated to around 60 percent (Tsarev, 1996). This would mean that
around 420,000 people in Arkhangelsk Oblast are directly and indirectly dependent on
the forest sector.
In relation to the whole industrial sector in Arkhangelsk, the forest sector is the
largest employer, (47% of the working force) followed by machine building,
including ship building, (30%), and food production (8%) (cf. Diagram 2:3).
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Diagram 2:3. Industrial employment in Arkhangelsk, 1993, percent. (Source: IIASA
Russian Forest Study Database.)
As can be seen in Table 2:5 the forest sector has kept its relative dominance. Figures
for the first nine month of 19985 also indicate that, in terms of employment, the sector
now has about the same relative size as it had at the beginning of the 1990s. Can this
be explained by an increased activity within the forest sector or does it reflect that the
crisis in other sectors has been worse? Table 2:5 tells us that there has been a general
decrease in  industrial employment. It might also be worth emphasizing that the size
of the work force does not automatically reflect success or failure in the economy. For
example, it is a common pattern in the forest sector in industrialized countries that
production increases while the work force is simultaneously reduced. Some answers
to the questions above can be acquired by consulting production figures etc. for the
forest sector. This is the topic for the next section.
Table 2:5. Industrial employment in Arkhangelsk during the transition (Percent).
1994 1995 1996 1997
Total industrial employment 191591 (100) 176537 (100) 162821 (100) 149663 (100)
Total forest sector 94794 (49) 80696 (46) 55472 (34) 69076 (46)
  Harvesting 44850 (23) 39858 (23) 37667 (23) 35695 (24)
  Woodworking 27162 (14) 22244 (13) 17805 (11) 15261 (10)
  Pulp and paper 22782 (12) 18594 (11) 17623 (11) 18120 (12)
Source: Reports from Arkhangelsk Regional Employment Service.
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 Source: Reports from Arkhangelsk Regional Employment Service.
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Production
In general, the contribution to the total Russian economy from Arkhangelsk and North
Russia is rather modest, 0.9 and 5.6 percent respectively. However, of the total
production value of wood, cellulose, and paper in the Russian Federation, 21.1
percent comes from North Russia and 9.2 percent from Arkhangelsk. Apart from
Irkutsk in East Siberia (contributing 11.2% of the value) no other region in Russia
contributes as much as Arkhangelsk Oblast (Bradshaw & Palacin, 1997:79-82). This
was true in 1987 and six years later, in 1993, the situation was unchanged (Huber et
al., 1996: 35).
As was noted above the forest sector dominates the industrial sector in Arkhangelsk
and despite a general downfall in the production it is still a corner-stone of the
regional economy (making up around 46% of total regional industrial production and
employing 46% of its industrial labor).
In general, the Russian industrial output has declined dramatically since 1990 – it was
reduced by around 50 percent between 1990 and 1995. In Arkhangelsk this decline
has “only” been around 40 percent for the same period (Bradshaw & Palacin,
1997:114-116). From Table 2:6 can be concluded that the relative decline in
production has been significantly smaller in Arkhangelsk compared to the Russian
average and, for instance, the Murmansk, Moscow, Tomsk and Khabarovsk regions.
How can this be explained?
Table 2:6. Change in industrial production. (Volume of output in 1995 in percent of
1991).
Russia Arkh-
angelsk
Mur-
mansk
Moscow
Oblast
Tomsk Irkutsk Krasno-
yarsk
Khaba-
rovsk
50 60 58 32 53 66 66 34
Source: Bradshaw & Palacin, 1997, pp. 114-116.
The general decline in the Russian industry has been most severe in the “light
industry” sector, while, for example, “fuel” has succeeded fairly well (Hanson &
Kirkow, 1997). In Arkhangelsk Oblast the sector “light industry”, is small and today it
contributes only 0.8 percent of the industrial output (Table 2:4). Fuel production only
accounts for 5.6 percent of the industrial output and can hardly explain the fact that
the output reduction in Arkhangelsk has been relatively small. “Electric power
generation” has significantly increased its relative importance and another explanation
is that, due to favorable geographical circumstances that provide good export
facilities, Arkhangelsk has succeeded to keep a significant part of its export. This will
be discussed further with a special focus on the forest sector but first the general
changes in the forest sector production shall be discussed.
Changes in Forest Sector Production
As can be concluded from Diagram 2:4 the downfall in the production of forest
products started long before the dismantling of the Soviet Union. For example,
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already between 1970–1990 the general removal of wood6 dropped with around 30
percent. However, during the post-Soviet period, between 1990–1996, the removal
has continued to decrease but now by around 60 percent. Taking the whole period into
consideration the downfall has been significant, about 70 percent. The same pattern
can be seen for other products except for cellulose. The production of cellulose
increased well into 1990 but has fallen significantly since then. The current
production of around one million ton is tangent to the figures of the 1970s.
Diagram 2:4. Changes in forest sector production in Arkhangelsk Oblast between
1970–1996 (Source: Tsarev, E.G., 1997.)
In Table 2:7, which displays the whole transition period, production is broken down
into more detailed categories. As can be seen from the table, with no exception, the
production of all types of forest products has fallen during the transition period, some
products more than others. When it comes to the production of fiber board, paper and
cardboard more than 50 percent of the production has been retained. This can be
compared to the production of lumber and chip board. The output of those products
has been retained merely by around 30 and 3 percent respectively. It is close at hand
to assume that the “winners” are those sectors which have succeeded to continue to
export their products.
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 Removal of wood is not equivalent to harvesting. The term stands for removal of commercial wood.
For many reasons – low commercial value as well as production inefficiencies – parts of the harvested
wood is never removed from the forest.
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Table 2:7. Forest industrial production in Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1990–1997
Year
Product 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1997
to 1996
%*
Timber transpor-
tation, cub.m 000
19567.0 16441.1 15627.8 11892.9  9341.4  9012.6 8003.6 86.0
Level to 1990, % 100 83.6 76.5 60.2 47.4 45.9 40.7 -
Commercial
timber production,
cub.m 000
19395.5 15605.9 13930.1 11417.0 8117.5 7990.7 7228.3 90.0
Level to 1990, % 100 80.5 71.8 58.9 41.9 41.2 37.3 -
Round timber,
cub.m 000
16788.9 13662.0 12400.9 9557.1 7327.2 7265.4 6504.2 -
Level to 1990, % 100 81.4 73.9 56.9 43.6 43.3 38.7 -
Lumber,
cub.m 000
4309.4 3693.4 3018.8 2674.4 2293.7 1737.4 1533.1 91.0
Level to 1990, % 100 85.8 69.7 62.0 53.2 39.5 34.8 -
Lumber (export),
cub.m 000
1824.2 1430.0 1120.0 1000.0 862.0 603.0 517.0 -
Level to 1990, % 100 78.4 61.4 54.82 47.2 33.0 28.3 -
Fiber board,
sq. m 000
22400.0 18257.0 17662.2 18012.5 15083.9 13474.0 12865.2 103
Level to 1990, % 100 81.5 78.8 80.4 67.3 66.2 57.4 -
Chip board,
cub.m 000
170.4 171.8 140.8 133.4 40.4 21.2 5.2 6.3
Level to 1990, % 100 101 82.9 78.2 23.5 12.3 3.0 -
Pulp, tons 000 2154.3 1881.2 1657.0 1529.4 1211.6 1344.4 1021.0 132
Level to 1990, % 100 87.3 79.9 71.0 56.2 62.4 47.7 -
Market pulp,
tons 000
912.9 771.1 730.15 659.2 548.3 602.9 409.4 172
Level to 1990, % 100 84.4 79.9 72.2 60.0 66.0 44.8 -
Paper, tons 000 396.5 364.4 299.1 304.1 177.1 211.1 208.4 77.0
Level to 1990, % 100 91.9 75.5 76.8 44.7 53.3 52.5 -
Cardboard,
tons 000
628.1 559.4 460.1 417.3 367.7 399.7 333.0 134
Level to 1990, % 100 89.0 73.2 66.4 58.6 63.7 53.0 -
Furniture, mln rou-
bles (prices 1990)
42.3 - - - - - 1.5 -
Level to 1990, % 100 - - - - - 3.5 -
* Based on data for the first six months of the respective years.
Source: Arkhangelsk Oblast (1997), Goskomstat Rossii (1996b).
Export of Forest Products
The main part of the wood that is exported from Russia consists of round wood and
sawn wood. Japan, Finland, and Sweden are the most important buyers of Russian
wood. Arkhangelsk accounts for one third of Russia’s total export of forest products
(Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:133). Still in 1997, 82 percent of the regional export
value, or 370.5 million USD, could be attributed to the forest sector (Kologreev,
1997).
It has been noticed that the export of wood follows the general level of harvesting in
the country. Accordingly, falling levels of harvesting coincide with reduced export.
The first years of the transition, between 1989–1993, the export of logs fell by 73
percent while the saw timber export was reduced by 61 percent (IIASA Russian
Forest Study Database). As can be seen in Table 2:8, however, the situation regarding
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pulp, cardboard, and lumber has improved to some extent during the last couple of
years.
Table 2:8. Export of forest products from Arkhangelsk 1993–1998.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Pulp, 1000 ton 359 442 410 319 397 309
Cardboard, 1000 ton 135 149 143 77 162 175
Lumber, 1000 m3 1532 1207 813 858 854 895
Round wood, 1000 m3 322 587 457 124 160 384
Plywood, m3 74257 181810 41529 9077 16436 22128
Particle board,  m2 25031 5398 958 46 - -
Paper, 1000 ton 170 119 191 101 149 103
Source: Statistical reports of Arkhangelsk regional Custom House.
Table 2:9 shows that during the last five years there has been a relative change among
products exported from Arkhangelsk. Pulp, paper and cardboard has virtually doubled
its share of the export while forest products has decreased correspondingly.
Table 2:9. Structure of the regional exports (percent) 1993–1997.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Forest products 50.0 34.1 10.4 25.0 21.2
Pulp 13.3 37.7 49.7 32.1 28.2
Paper and cardboard 9.3 13.7 27.9 22.3 21.1
Others 27.4 14.5 12.0 20.6 29.5
Source: Arkhangelsk Region in 1997. Statistical data. Official issue. Arkhangelsk, 1998.
Arkhangelsk has always been a large exporter of lumber. In 1993, more than one third
of the production (41.7%) was exported, 35.5 percent was produced for the internal
market while the rest (22.8%) went to other parts of Russia (Diagram 2:5).
Diagram 2:5. Sales distribution of lumber produced in Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1993.
Percent. (Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database.)
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Today, there are 156 exporters of lumber in the Arkhangelsk region. Only 20 of them
can be regarded as professional and qualified in export trade. These exporters account
for 66 percent of lumber export to 12 European countries. The remaining 136
exporters account for 34 percent of lumber exports. These actors are not as
knowledgeable about the real market situation, the rules of trade, etc., and they have a
tendency to supply low quality production at artificially low prices (Kologreev, 1997).
The current export of lumber is directed to the following countries (Kologreev, 1997):
Europe:
Netherlands (33.2%)
Germany (16.6%)
Great Britain (12.5%)
France (10.2%)
Belgium (5.6%)
Austria, Spain, Iceland, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland.
FSU:
Ukraine, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Latvia, Estonia, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenia.
Asia and Middle East:
Egypt (7.5%)
Israel (1.8%)
Iran (1.7%)
Saudi Arabia, Turkey.
Other countries (2.7%)
When it comes to timber, however, only an insignificant part of the production (1%)
is exported while the main part of the production remains in the region. This has of
course to do with the local processing of timber, e.g., into board and paper.
Eventually, parts of these volumes are exported as well.
Diagram 2:6. Sales distribution of commercial timber produced in Arkhangelsk
Oblast in 1993. Percent. (Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database)
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Currently, there are 40 exporters of round timber in Arkhangelsk region. Six of them,
accountable for 62.9 percent of the exports, supply more than 5,000 m3 per year.
Totally, only 13 traders export more than 1,000 m3 (24.4%). Since they are fairly
small it is likely that the remaining 21 suppliers (accountable for 12.7% of the
exports) use different intermediaries in their export trade (Kologreev, 1997).
The current export of timber is directed to the following countries: Finland (73%),
Norway (20.2%), Germany (4.7%), Austria, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia,
Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Sweden, and Estonia (2.1%).
Finally, to this picture of the relative importance of the forest sector in the
Arkhangelsk Oblast it can be added that although production decreases might have
been more severe in other regions, the productivity of the industry has not been
significantly improved. The sector is still far from productive. Using data from 1994,
Huber et al. (1997:107 ff.) have calculated the productivity of different industrial
sectors of the Russian economy. They found that in terms of capital as well as labor
productivity the forest sector has the lowest figures of all sectors, followed by light
industry. This fact might be explained by the relatively low rate of further processing
in the sector, its labor intensity, and a generally weak demand for forest products.
Infrastructure
The size and quality of the transportation network influence the ability to access
forests as well as the possibilities for realization of their industrial potential. In
general, the North Russia region has a very low road density, 28.2 km/1,000 km2.
(This is roughly equal to 5 percent of the Scandinavian average.) It has also been
noticed that the quality of these roads are very low, a significant part of the roads lack
hard cover, they are poorly maintained, and so forth. There are also a number of
waterways and railways (see Map 2:1 page 26).
Table 2:10. Road (with hard cover) and railway density, km/1,000km2  (1992)
Russia North Russia Far East Arkhangelsk
Railways 9.2 10.8 1.9 7.8
Roads 40.9 28.3 8.1 15.5
Source: The IIASA Russian Forest Study Database.
As can be seen in Table 2:10 both road density and railway density is fairly low but
significantly higher than in the Far East to which the region has been compared.7 The
reason for comparing Arkhangelsk with the Far East is another feature of the
transportation system, namely its scope, i.e., the extent to which municipalities and
settlements have road access to the capital of the region. In the Far East only 59
percent of the settlements have an all-year-round connection to the regional capitals.
In North Russia the corresponding figure is 75.6 percent and in Arkhangelsk 50
percent (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:22). Only one major road, the one to Vologda,
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 The condition of roads is a big and general problem. In Russia many haulage roads have a short useful
life and many are also winter roads. Our data show that, in some cases, the road density has, in fact,
decreased over the years. In Arkhangelsk, however, the road density has increased significantly since
1987.
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crosses the oblast border.8 Thus, we can say that Arkhangelsk has a rich but a
geographically rather concentrated system of roads.
Arkhangelsk was the first export harbor in Russia and the country’s first shipyard was
established here already in 1870. The largest harbor is open the year around and is
mainly used for export of forest products. In addition there are four smaller, non
military, harbors that are partly used for timber export. These are the harbors of
Onega, Mezen, Naryan Mar, and Amderma. There are two shipping companies. The
Northern Shipping Company and the JS Northern River Shipping Company. The first
was established in 1870 and on December 1992 it became a join stock company. It
employs around 7,800 people (5,500 sea personnel and about 2,300 land based) and it
has almost 100 cargo ships which provide regular shipments (i.a. of timber) to some
ten European harbors.
The JS Northern River Shipping Company is mainly engaged in river shipping along
the river ways of Arkhangelsk and the rest of European Russia, but it also runs traffic
in Europe (e.g. in the Baltic Sea and the Northern Sea). This company is younger,
“only” 75 years old. It became a joint stock company in 1998, 25 percent of the stock
is owned by the state and among the rest of the shareholders we find shipyards and a
smaller shipping company, however having around 200 cargo and passenger boats as
well as around 100 barges.9
Arkhangelsk has a system of waterways with many ramifications. Much of the 3,770
km long waterways (IIASA Russian Forest Study Database) are navigable and some
parts are used for timber floating. Partly due to the low road density these waterways
are also used for passenger traffic but this traffic has been heavily reduced. In general,
most modes of transportation have been affected by the decreased activity in the
central sectors of production. Between 1990 and 1995, freight transports were
drastically reduced, railway transports by 64 percent, automobile transports by 60
percent and internal waterway transports by as much as 87 percent (Goskomstat
Arkhangelsk, 1997).
Forest Roads
The existence of a rich net of forest roads is essential for the development of the forest
sector. Arkhangelsk Oblast is vast, however, and many areas are very far away from
the capital and, as we have seen, the general road density is fairly low. This is true
also for roads on forest lands. The Arkhangelsk figure of 0.08 km forest roads/km2 is
tangent to the North-Russian average. However, significant volumes of wood are
transported on winter roads and if Arkhangelsk’s around 5,000 km of winter roads are
added we get a road density of 0.1 km/km2 (IIASA Russian Forest Study Database).
Even if this figure is relatively high it is significantly lower than what is regarded as
an optimum, 0.5 km forest roads/km2 (Strakhov et al., 1996:95).
According to current standard the harvesting of one million m3 of wood requires 48.5
km of new, permanent roads (Strakhov, et al., 1996:94). This means that if, in the
future, the harvesting in Arkhangelsk would increase to only 50 percent of the AAC
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 For a discussion about possible developments of the railway system, see the report “Future Rail
Traffic in the Barents Region” published by The Swedish Railways, printed in Umeå, Sweden, January
1998.
9
 Source: Advertising material from the Northern Shipping Company and the Northern River Shipping
Company.
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one would need to construct around 500 km of new roads!10 A production level
tangent to AAC would require around 1,000 km of new permanent forest roads.
Earlier in the report we have discussed the accessibility problem and its connection to
harvesting behavior. It was assumed that in the long run local over-harvesting along
transportation routes would drive harvesting operations into increasingly remote
areas. Thus, the costs for the construction of new transportation roads would affect the
profitability in the forest sector. In order to “verify” this hypothesis we have
calculated the relation between exploitable forest lands and road density. The logic
would be that if there exists a local over-cutting one would expect to find a strong,
negative correlation between road density and remaining forest resources, i.e., more
exploitable forests – less roads.
Using the variables “kilometer roads per hectare” and “percentage of mature and over
mature forests in relation to forested areas” (from the IIASA Russian Forest Study
Database) we get a correlation coefficient of –0.62 (Spearman’s Rank Correlation
ranges from –1 to 1). Thus, it seems that where one finds the highest density of
exploitable forests one also has the greatest need for road construction. However, if
winter roads are excluded the figure changes significantly (–0.32). This might indicate
that the use of winter roads is not primarily, in fact, a way of getting access to remote
forest areas thus facilitating local overcutting. They constitute an integrated part of the
existing but criticized harvesting policy that so far has created undesirable
environmental outcomes. Thus, the opening of more remote logging areas would still
require permanent transportation lines. Taking into account that the overall road
density is fairly low in Arkhangelsk it can be concluded that future forest exploitation
will require significant investments in the transportation system.
Summary:
The situation of the Arkhangelsk forest resource and its physical environment can be
summarized as follows:
• Vast forest recourses are available for possible exploitation. Most of the forested
lands have not yet been exposed to industrial harvesting.
• The present species composition is partly caused by poor regeneration after clear-
cutting the coniferous stands.
• Around 60 percent of the forest fund consists of mature or overmature forests.
• Due to extensive harvesting along the major transportation lines, areas of local
over-harvesting can be found. A future harvesting in more remote areas will cause
increased costs for wood supply.
• Still around 80 percent of all harvesting is by means of clear-cutting. Lack of
deliberate regeneration programs causes a general degeneration of the forests and
will possible affect future wood supply. Still, methods such as thinning and
pruning are conducted more as experiments rather than as a means of long-term
investment.
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 The Annual Allowable Cut is 21.3 mill. m3 (Arkhangelsk Forest Management, 1996).
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• Extensive investments in the infrastructure – especially in forest roads – are
needed to develop the forest sector but also for the securing of a sustainable
forestry.
• Significant losses of forest recourses are caused by pests, diseases, and forest fires
as well as inefficient management methods.
• Around 60 percent of the population in working age, i.e. around 420,000 people
are directly dependent on the forest sector. The export of forest products accounts
for more than 80 percent of the total export value. During the last two years the
forest export has shown a tendency to recover.
• Due to a relatively diversified industrial structure the decline in the industry has
been less severe in Arkhangelsk compared to the Russian average. When it comes
to the forest sector, however, production has been reduced by around 60 percent
since 1990.
• The forest sector in the Arkhangelsk region is very important both as an employer
and as a provider of income for the region. In terms of forest resources the oblast
is one of Russia’s richest areas.
• In general, the forest sector has a rather low productivity, and the poor availability
of wood is reinforced by an insufficient infrastructure.
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3. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Arkhangelsk Oblast
Including the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Arkhangelsk Oblast covers an area of 587,400
km2. (This is slightly larger than the area of France.) The oblast is sparsely populated –
the average population density is 2.6 persons per km2, which can be compared to the
Russian average of 8.7.11 Of the total regional population of 1.5 million people 27
percent live in rural settlements. The region is subdivided into 20 administrative
districts, raiony. The city of Arkhangelsk, which was founded already in 1584, today
hosts around 400,000 people. Of the other 11 cities in the region only Severodvinsk
(245,000 inhabitants) has a population larger than 70,000 people. The population
consists of 92 percent ethnic Russians, around 3 percent Ukrainians, and various other
ethnic groups, of which the Nenets and Komi comprise the largest part (IIASA Russian
Forest Study Database).
In terms of demographic change Arkhangelsk has been severely hit by the transition. As
can be seen from Diagram 3:1 the population has decreased significantly since the
beginning of Perestroika. While Russia has seen its population increase by around 1
percent the Northern Region has faced a notable downfall. The demographic situation is
worse than in Siberia, for example, but comparable to the Far East.
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Diagram 3:1. Changes in population between 1987 and 1995. Percent. (Based on
Granåsen et al., 1997)
The drop in population is directly affected by three factors, birth rates, death rates and
migration. Between 1987 and 1995, the Russian death rates increased by nearly 50
percent while birth rates dropped from 17.2 to 9 per 1,000 inhabitants. During this
period life expectancy fell by seven years for men and three years for women. In 1991,
the increasing population trend was broken and despite a positive migration Russia’s
population declined by more than one million people (Granåsen, et al., 1997). This is an
important change in the socio-economic situation caused by Perestroika and the
subsequent transition period (cf. for instance Shapiro, 1995).
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  Sources related to this paragraph: RUSSLINE – Russian Internet Directory
http://www.rusline.com/oblast/arkhange/arkhang.htm (27 January, 1999) and Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996.
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Arkhangelsk Oblast has experienced a similar demographic development. From 1987 to
1996, birth rates dropped from 18.3 to 8.5 births per thousand inhabitants while death
rates rose from 9.3 to 13.7. Within four years only, from 1990 to 1994, life expectancy
fell from 69.6 to 62.4 years (Granåsen, et al., 1997:42). Migration has also contributed
to the decrease of the population in Arkhangelsk. The present migration ratio is –2.6 per
1,000 inhabitants or an annual outflow of around 4,000 people.12 However, this has not
yet affected the distribution between age groups in any significant way. Around 58
percent of the population is between 18–60 year. This figure is about the same as the
Russian average (57%) (Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996:35).
To sum up, the demographic situation in Arkhangelsk is worse than in many other
Russian regions. This also supports a conclusion made by Bradshaw and Palacin (1996),
Huber et al. (1997:19 ff.) and others that the central parts of Russia, to which we might
refer Arkhangelsk, have suffered more serious demographic deterioration than more
remote parts of the Federation, such as Siberia.
Education
Arkhangelsk has four institutes of higher education, the Pomor International University,
Arkhangelsk State Engineering University, Arkhangelsk State Medical Academy, and a
branch (filial) of the St. Petersburg based Admiral S. Makaros State Naval Academy.
The first three enroll around 15,000 students while the fourth together with 26 other
specialized schools enroll about 18,000 students. The Arkhangelsk State Engineering
University is the successor of the former Arkhangelsk Forest Engineering Institute and
has retained a strong emphasis on forestry and related disciplines. In total there are at
least 10 different research organizations that directly deal with forest related topics in
the oblast.13
In comparison with many other Russian regions Arkhangelsk has succeeded fairly well
to retain its education level. While Russia lost 12 percent of its students between 1987
and 1993 Arkhangelsk increased the number of students in higher education
establishments. In fact, after 1993, the oblast has further increased the proportion of
people involved in higher education. In 1997, 16,960 students were involved in higher
education which gives a ratio of 110.5 students per 10,000 inhabitants (Goskomstat
Arkhangelsk, 1997:31). However, this figure is significantly lower than the Russian
average of 190 students per 10,000 inhabitants (Goskomstat, 1997) but also lower than
many other population centers in forested areas, such as Novosibirsk or Tomsk
(Carlsson & Olsson, 1998:23).
                                                
12
 Source: RUSSLINE – Russian Internet Directory
(http://www.rusline.com/oblast/arkhange/arkhang.htm), 27 January 1999.
13
 A question to BARENTS-L, a mailing list devoted to discussion about the development of the Barents
Euro-Arctic Region, produced references to 10 forest related institutes and organizations in Arkhangelsk
Oblast. A compilation of the answers to our question can be found on the list’s archive at URL:
ftp://ftp.umu.se/home/mao-ftp/BARENTS-L-Archive/arkhfor (April 7, 1999).
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Table 3:1. Students in higher educational establishments per 10,000 inhabitants 1987-
1993, index.
Region 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Students
per
10,000
Change
1987–93
Russian Federation 100 98 99 98 96 92 88 171 -12
Arkhangelsk 100 97 101 102 107 107 107 96 7
Karelia 100 103 109 107 109 107 103 121 3
Komi 100 98 96 91 92 91 95 88 -5
Murmansk 100 100 102 98 100 98 113 63 13
Vologda 100 100 103 100 102 100 107 128 7
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database
The relatively low education profile is also reflected in the work force. Typically, the
level of education is relatively low in the Russian forest sector. This is reflected in the
proportion of workers in the sector. In Siberia the proportion of workers in relation to all
personnel in forest enterprises is around 87 percent (Nilsson et al., 1994:54). However,
if we look only at silviculture, which is virtually the responsibility of the Federal Forest
Service, we find that the relation is reversed; employees with higher education
dominate. In Siberia around 80 percent of the personnel in forest management have
higher or secondary education (Nilsson et al., 1994)14.
One might perhaps expect the situation in Arkhangelsk to be the same. However, as
Table 3:2 indicates the general level of education is comparatively lower. In fact, no
other oblast or republic in the Northern Region has as few specialists with higher
education as has Arkhangelsk – 44 specialists per 1,000 inhabitants. This can be
compared with the Russian average of 56 or Karelia’s 55 specialists with higher
education per 1,000 inhabitants. In general, the education level in a region reflects a
potential resource that might be valuable in the restructuring of the economy. Thus, in
this respect the situation in Arkhangelsk seems somewhat problematic.
Table 3:2. Higher education, 1989
Region/oblast/republic Specialists with higher
education
Specialists with higher
education per 1,000 inh.
Russian federation 8,241,880 56
Karelia 43,840 55
Komi 62,633 50
Arkhangelsk 69,066 44
Vologda 61,560 45
Murmansk 64,623 56
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database
                                                
14
  Nilsson et al. are referring to Isaev, A.S. (ed.) Forecast of the utilization and reproduction of the forest
resources by economic regions of the USSR, Academy of Sciences of the USSR and State Forestry
Committee of the USSR, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, 1991.
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The Work Force
In 1997, the officially registered unemployment level in Arkhangelsk was 8.1 percent of
the economically active population (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1998). This figure was
the highest in the Northern Region and significantly higher than the Russian average of
2.2 percent. Out of Russia’s 87 administrative regions only nine had a higher
unemployment rate (Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996:131–132). Estimates of actual
employment are also published nowadays. As is shown in Table 3:3 the share of
registered unemployed almost trebled between 1993 and 1997 (from 3 to 8%) while the
estimated total unemployment more or less doubled, increasing from 6.1 percent of the
economically active population to 12.6 percent in the same period. The figures also
indicate that people are increasingly making use of the public employment agencies.
Table 3:3 Employment and unemployment in Arkhangelsk Oblast 1993–1997 (percent).
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Economically active population: 100 100 100 100 100
 - employed in the economy      93.9 89.9 88.7 87.5 87.4
 - unemployed *        6.1 10.1 11.3 12.5 12.6
      of which officially unemployed
     (i.e. those registered in the
     Employment Service)        3.0 5.2 8.2 7.8 8.1
*  People who are 16 years or older and who have no work, are looking for work, or are ready to start
work are considered as unemployed.
Source: Goskomstat Arkhangelsk (1998).
Even so, a registered unemployment of 8.1 percent might still be seen as artificially low.
Quite obviously, a great number of Russian enterprises would simply not continue to
exist if normal market economic principles were really guiding their decisions to
continue or discontinue their activity. Under such a regime many enterprises would
simply not be considered profitable enough to warrant a continued existence. And yet,
despite the fact that unprofitable enterprises have been allowed to continue their
activities, there has been a significant increase in unemployment. On the other hand, the
mass unemployment rate that was feared to be the result of the Russian transition has
not materialized either (Manning, 1995).
Some western observers (cf. for example Layard & Richter, 1995) claim that, in
general, it seems that the Russian labor market has been sufficiently flexible to mitigate
mass unemployment of the kind that could (theoretically) be expected. However, other
western observers have claimed that unemployment rates might be substantially higher
than what is indicated both by the official estimates and by the estimates made by many
western observers. Thus, in certain regions the real unemployment may well be higher
than 30 and sometimes even higher than 50 percent of the economically active
population (cf. Hedlund & Sundström, 1996).
If one takes into account that many frequently used economic parameters are likely to
be flawed the situation might be close to catastrophic especially in the light of the
severe downfall in the economy that occurred by mid 1998. Gaddy and Ickes (1998)
have launched the notion of “virtual economy” to underline the fact that the greater part
of the Soviet economy is still intact.
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The new system can be called Russia’s virtual economy because it is based on an illusion
about almost every important parameter: prices, sales, wages, taxes, and budgets. At its
heart is the pretense that the economy is much larger than it really is. This pretense allows
for a larger government and larger expenditures than Russia can afford. It is the real cause
behind the web of wage, supply, and tax arrears from which Russia cannot seem to extricate
itself. (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998:1)
This type of economy might continue to work only if it is insulated from market
competition, e.g., through an extensive use of barter, which effectively breaks the
market based price signals and allows the use of fictitious prices of goods and services
quite separated from their market values. This practice maintains the “pretence” of
value creation while industry is in fact a “value destructor.” Consequently, if Gaddy and
Ickes are right, there exists “hoards” of potentially unemployed workers, engineers,
bureaucrats, and others.
There has been a documented increase of unemployment among people with higher
education in Russia, but unemployment has increased significantly more among people
lacking secondary education, especially in the age group 20-49 years. Thus, better
educated people are better off (Radaev, 1997; Vishnevskaya, 1997). One important
contributing factor is that new, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)15 have
succeeded in attracting a number of educated people and thus to some extent alleviating
the unemployment situation (Radaev, 1997:34). If this is a reality also in Arkhangelsk is
really an open ended question. However, according to statistics from September 1996
there are 3,900 SMEs, with 40,000 employees, in the oblast. Most of them (47%) are
engaged in service and trade, 17 percent in industry, 15 percent construction and 5
percent in consultancy (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1998:81).
Up to 1996, 1,079 enterprises have changed ownership (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk,
1998). Already in 1994, around 80 percent of the enterprises were privatized (Bradshaw
and Palacin, 1996:134). However, of the whole apartment stock only 22.4 percent has
been privatized (Goskomstat Arkhangelsk, 1998). This indicates that important features
of the Soviet system still remain. For example, many of the larger companies still
provide housing and a number of other social services, for their employees. This will be
discussed later.
It can be assumed that the slower pace of privatization in Arkhangelsk compared to
other parts of Russia depends on the dominance of military industries.16 Many of the
military enterprises will not be privatized at all, and if they are, the process may be more
time consuming than is normally the case (Vishnevskaya, 1997). Especially in the city
of Severodvinsk the military industrial complex is important and employs a great
number of workers and people with higher education who are used to work with
advanced technology. However, due to the general economic situation and the
disintegration of the armed forces there is a limited demand for the products from
Severodvinsk, e.g., nuclear powered submarines. However, places like Severodvinsk
which have lots of specialists, have a potential in its work force that might be useful in
other sectors of the economy.
                                                
15
 SMEs are defined as having  up to 200 employees.
16
 For example, in 1994, 32% of all apartments were privatized in Russia, but only 18% in Arkhangelsk.
The same year 9% of all Russian enterprises were state owned, while the corresponding figure for
Arkhangelsk was 20% (Bradshaw and Palacin, 1996:134).
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In general, nominal wages are higher in Arkhangelsk than they are in the Russian
Federation. Wages are not the same as income, however. While the wage level in
Arkhangelsk is equal to the Russian average, incomes are 22 percent lower (Bradshaw
& Palacin, 1996:120–123). One way of comparing standards of living is to look at
income relative to established subsistence minimum. This will adjust for costs of living
which are normally higher in the Northern Region than, for example, in Siberia. Using
this measure one can conclude that while the Russian figure is 238 percent, the figure
for Arkhangelsk is “only” 185 percent. This indicates that while Arkhangelsk does have
a high wage level, the subsistence minimum level is also relatively high. Moreover,
during the entire transition period the income figures have fallen significantly in most
Russian regions with the exception of Moscow where incomes have risen with 47
percent (Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996:123).
What is the wage level in the forest sector? The so-called “forest complex” of
Arkhangelsk Oblast consists of 136 enterprises, of which in June 1997 a mere 38 (28%)
were making a profit, the remaining 98 enterprises (72%) were running at a loss
(Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1997). In no other industrial sector in the region there are as many
firms. However, the wage level in the “forest complex” is relatively low, 21 percent
lower than the average for the industrial sector in the region (see Table 3:3). Although
the figures in Table 3:3 are from 1993 they reflect the current situation fairly well. Thus,
it can be concluded that the forest industrial sector will have problems to attract people
using its wage level as a “carrot” – something that will be needed in order to get an
inflow of specialists (for example people trained in modern marketing and engineers
specialized in logistics).
The situation at the lespromkhoz Svetlozerskles illustrates some aspects of contemporary
reality (see the following box)17.
                                                
17
 In 1998, we commissioned an article on a lespromkhoz in Arkhangelsk Oblast from Yuri Lvov, the
resident correspondent of Lesnaia Gazeta in Arkhangelsk. The article is reproduced in this and following
“fact boxes”.
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The Lespromhkoz “Svetlozerskles” 1998:
Chief forester Ivan Shenyakov, director of the “Svetlozerskles” southern harvesting site, came to Lake Svetlyi from the
Leningrad region in 1981. He was lured to come by the perspective of getting an apartment in a house with
conveniences. At the time it was the dream of many a young man who had no living quarters of their own, while here
the state had just put up a new lespromkhoz with a powerful at the time resource base. Surrounded by swamps and
obscure taiga, not far from a lake by the name of Svetlyi (meaning “bright”), a settlement went up. It consisted of
several five-storey apartment buildings and duplexes. They had running water, central heating provided by a furnace
room. To a person not used to conveniences, it seemed very comfortable.
For 11 years Ivan Nikolayevich worked as a feller and when his health began failing he became a chief. He has
three sons. It is obvious that the eldest two will not follow in father’s footsteps. One of them has moved to Vladimir and
entered a military school, the other is taking a farming course in the district center Kholmogory. The youngest still goes
to school. The family has its personal plot, a small farm with a cow, a pig and a goat.
In contrast to chief forester Ivan Shenyakov, Mikhail Odegov his operator of the feller-buncher “Timber Jack-618”,
has no personal plot. He claims that he has no time for it. He is still young and has given no consideration to the future.
He claims no one knows what awaits us even in a month, to say nothing of the close future. At the same time many are
already deserting the Svetlyi settlement in search of a better life. The rent has fallen to 5 thousand rubles, while in
Arkhangelsk, 125 kilometers from Svetlyi, rents are 10-20 times higher.  Mikhail is one of the most highly-paid
operators not only in the timber industry of “Svetlozerskles”, but in the region as a whole. In the winter months
(approximately from November to March), working 12 hours a day, his labor brings in about 3000 rubles a month (in
the spring of 1998 this was roughly equal to 500 dollars), while in 1997 the average earnings at this enterprise
amounted to 1070 rubles a month.
– Three thousand is not what should be paid for operating such complex technology. You need instantaneous
reaction, measurement by eye. Working in the darkness when the trees are snow-covered is extremely tiring. Switch
off the antenna of your TV and just try to make out the picture for 12 hours non-stop – that’s the “picture” I see behind
the glass of my machine. It really looks nice when observed from the side, when the glimmering green-painted
machine “grabs” a tree and the next moment fells it, raising a cloud of snow. And although it is warm and comfortable
in the cabin, where you can even switch on a tape and treat yourself to a music break, Mikhail considers himself
cheated. A Canadian operator by the name of Earl helped him to master the machine. He is paid 10 thousand dollars a
month for the same job, “while I, – says Odegov, – can’t even afford to buy myself a car, or go somewhere for a
vacation”.
(by Yuri Lvov)
Obviously other industrial sectors such as “fuel” and “microbiology” have much higher
wages. The situation is virtually the same in the other oblasts and republics in the North
Region with one exception, Murmansk, where the forest sector has a wage level 24
percent higher than Arkhangelsk (IIASA Russian Forest Study Database). This might be
explained by the fact that Murmansk is a very small producer of wood while
Arkhangelsk has a significant amount of manual workers engaged in harvesting, etc.
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Table 3:3. Monthly wages in the industrial sector of Arkhangelsk, 1993.
Branch Rubles per Month Index
The whole industrial sector 79206.3 100
Electricity 141472.0 179
Fuel 176412.8 223
Oil 179548.9 227
Turf 29828.7 38
Iron processing 60722.3 77
Non-iron processing 80704.2 102
Chemical and petro-chemical 70569.3 89
Machine building 95689.5 121
Forest 62920.2 79
Building material 77824.4 98
Light 41907.7 53
Food 100741.6 127
Microbiological 141090.9 178
Flour and fodder 115447.9 146
Graphical 59882.0 76
Glass 8083.3 10
Pharmaceutical 67539.7 85
Other 64927.9 82
Source: IIASA Russian Forest Study Database
Summary:
With reference to the description and analyses above the socio-economic situation in
Arkhangelsk might be summarized as follows (see also Table in Appendix 3:1):
• The demographic problems in Arkhangelsk is worse than the average for the
Russian Federation.
• The education level of the workforce is significantly lower in Arkhangelsk
compared to many other areas as well as compared to the Russian average.
However, during the transition Arkhangelsk has succeeded fairly well in retaining
its education level in comparison with many other Russian regions. The Oblast also
has a strong emphasis on forest education.
• The proportion of educated people is lower in the forest sector than in most other
branches of the economy.
• The unemployment situation in Arkhangelsk is as severe as in the rest of the Russian
Federation.
• In general the wage level is higher in Arkhangelsk than in the Russian Federation,
but taking the costs of living into account, the oblast occupies a 49th position of
Russia’s 80 administrative areas in terms of wage income.
• With respect to the relatively high proportion of state employees, the low proportion
of privatized apartments, and the relatively low number of new small and medium
sized enterprises, Arkhangelsk can be said to have kept many of the features from
the old Soviet economy.
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• It cannot be concluded that the general standard of living is significantly higher in
Arkhangelsk than in the rest of the Northern Region. For example, although we find
lower percentages of poor households we find about the same housing space, fewer
cars, and more alcoholics.18
                                                
18
 Karelia has a higher rate of alcoholism.
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4. Institutional Configuration of the Forest Sector in
Arkhangelsk
In this chapter we describe the formal institutional setting that relates to the forest sector
in Arkhangelsk Oblast. The chapter starts with a short résumé of the Soviet forestry
system and how it emerged. We also give an account of how this system has changed
and how it works today. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a basis for an analysis
of the interactions between the various actors in the system, dealing with its formal as
well as its informal qualities.
The General Organization of the Forest Sector
In 1947, ten years after Arkhangelsk was assigned the status of oblast, the USSR
Council of Ministers adopted a resolution that made forest management uniform in the
whole union. After a short period of “decentralization” under the Khruschev era, the
forest management system returned to be heavily centralized. The system reached its
peak in the first years of the 1970s. The institutional history of the system has been
scrutinized in many publications and should not be recapitulated here (see e.g. Nove,
1977; Blandon, 1983; Barr & Braden, 1988; Sheingauz et al., 1995; World Bank, 1997).
Here we will concentrate on the situation as it appeared at the beginning of the 1980s.
The Soviet Union was known for its “parallel” system of government, i.e., its
intertwined triple lines of political administration – the communist party, the formal
political hierarchies and their bureaucracies. Accordingly, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the Council of Ministers were the supreme units of the forest
sector. Since political, administrative, and managerial units were assumed to belong to
the same “family” it was sometimes difficult to functionally separate one unit from
another. For example, although industrial ministries and committees were authorized to
govern all industrial activities while the Federal Forest Service was in charge of
silviculture, it was the communist party that in the end confirmed the five years plans
under which the whole forest sector operated. The forest sector was governed by
political decrees, there existed virtually no special forestry laws between the 1920s and
1977 (Sheingauz et al., 1995:1).
In the beginning of the 1980s, “The Ministry of Timber, Woodworking, Pulp and Paper
Industries” (Minlesbumprom) was responsible for forest industries and their activities
while another central unit, Gosleskhoz, the USSR State Forestry Committee (earlier the
Ministry of Forest Management, Minleskhoz) was accountable for forestry. More
chemically oriented forest industries were directly subordinated to the “Chief
Administration for Microbiology” (Glavmikrobioprom) (Barr & Braden, 1988:20).
The organizational features of the Soviet State were duplicated on lower administrative
levels. Through all levels down to the single district the system of government consisted
of three parallel hierarchies, the representative units, executives, and the communist
party (Campbell, 1995). Another feature that was typical for the system was its principle
of “dual subordination” (Nove, 1977:20). For example, the ministry of forestry in the
Russian republic was subordinated both to the central ministry of forestry and the
republic council of ministers. In cases where the ministries were not organized in this
way the local unit was always subordinated to the hierarchical structure of the
communist party. The same principle was also applied for the huge apparatus of
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planning with Gosplan as its nucleus. The five-year plans were worked out by central
and regional Gosplan authorities. Finally, when the party had confirmed the plans, they
received the status of law.
We have previously deliberated on the “forest fund” concept. Formally, Gosleskhoz
(which is today labeled the Federal Forest Service, Rosleskhoz) was the official
“proprietor” of this fund from which resources were sub-allocated to enterprises. At the
regional level harvesting areas were allocated to harvesting enterprises, timber was
allocated to sawmills, board to industries, and so forth. This was a very complicated
system with many authorities involved and, since there existed no real markets,
suppliers and users had to be coupled by administrative means. This also meant that
“users” were, in fact, no customers in the normal sense of the word. As Alec Nove has
emphasized “an allocation decision which ‘attaches’ (prikreplyayet) a supplier to a
customer contains within itself an instruction to produce as well as to deliver” (Nove,
1977:62). Although Gosplan and all its subunits elaborated specific production plans
the task of assigning, for example, a certain amount of timber to a particular sawmill fell
upon another important organization, “The State Committee on Procurement”
(Gossnab). We shall later see to what extent this idea of “attaching” suppliers to
customers has survived in today’s forest sector.
The forestry management system was, and still is, organized in a hierarchical system
from a central, Moscow, level down to the regional and municipal levels. During Soviet
times the central level, Minleskhoz and subsequently Gosleskhoz, had to coordinate its
activities with the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics as well as with the
parallel party structure. Although the system in operation in Russia today differs in
significant ways the main parts of the organizational structure of the FFS are still the
same, see Figure 4:1.19
The Federal Forest Service is organized in 81 regional bodies. In Arkhangelsk this
forestry committee is called “Arkhangelsk Forest Management” (Arkhangel’sk
upravlenie lesami). It should be noticed that the old system of “dual subordination” still
exists in that the committee is subordinated both to the FFS (or Rosleskhoz), the central
authority, and to the executive authority of the oblast. On behalf of the central
Rosleskhoz, these forestry committees are basically responsible for the protection and
regeneration of forests. In total, the Federal Forest Service and its committees are
accountable for around 94 percent of the Russian “forest fund.” Regional committees,
like the Arkhangelsk Forest Management, still assign areas for harvesting but nowadays
to privatized harvesting enterprises. As was already mentioned, the agricultural sector,
the military, and some other authorities possess parts of the Russian forest fund. No
forest lands have yet been privatized. However, the property rights situation with
respect to the ownership of the Russian forests is unclear. What is clear is the fact that
the forests belong to the state, but it is not clear to which part of the state they belong. In
a federation the property rights issue is particularly problematic. The forest code states
that the forest resources are jointly owned by the “Russian Federation and the Subjects
of the Russian Federation.” Accordingly, the forest lands of Arkhangelsk belong to the
Russian federation as well as to the oblast. This ambiguous situation did not change
with the new forests code adopted on January 22, 1997.
                                                
19
  There are a number of Federal Forest Service organizations which are not included in Fig. 4:1, such as
ten Forest Inventory and Planning units (lesoustroistvo), eight forest research institutes and eighteen air
forest protection units.
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Forest management units (leskhozy) 1,831
Forest districts (lesnichestva) 7,851
Forest compartments (uchastki) 13,969
Forest tending plots (obkhody) 68,935
Local Administrations
The Federal Forest Service
State Committee on
Environmental
Protection
(Goskomekologiia)
Government of Russia
Governments of the
Russian Republics,
with ministries,
committees, etc.
Administrations of
oblasts, etc. with
boards, forest industry
departments, etc.
National parks 28
Regional Forest Management 81
Figure 4:1. Forest Management Structure of the Russian Federation (Based on
Strakhov et al., 1996; World Bank, 1997.)
At the federal level the Russian forest fund is divided into 1,831 management units,
leskhozy. The geographical areas they possess often coincide with the lower
administrative areas of an oblast, the raion. For example, Arkhangelsk Oblast is
partitioned into 28 leskhozy. The forest lands that a leskhoz possesses is in turn divided
into districts (lesnichestva), forest compartments (uchastki) and numerous tending plots
(obkhody). The leskhoz is an entity with independent accounting and separate funding.
During Soviet times forest industries, leskhozy, sawmills, and state harvesting
enterprises (lespromkhozy) formed an integrated forestry system. It is this system that is
now disintegrating. In the more sparsely forested parts of the union not only silviculture
but also logging and timber production was left to the leskhoz. In the beginning of the
eighties their annual logging was 70–80 million m3 (Blandon, 1983:85). It should be
noticed, however, that during Soviet times harvesting and forest management, e.g.,
regeneration, was separated and there were basically no financial relations between
logging enterprises and the leskhoz.
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The Harvesting System in the Late Soviet Era
At the beginning of the 1980s Minlesbumprom was the central ministry responsible for
the forest industrial sector. As was the case in the forestry sector, with its leskhoz
system, the forest industrial sector was organized in a sophisticated hierarchical
administrative complex down to the individual enterprise. The system that was in place
in the eighties, just before the beginning of Perestroika, was organized in three levels of
management (cf. Figure 4:2).
MINISTRY
Combine Ob”edinenie
Regional
Ministries
lespromkhoz lespromkhoz
lesopunkt lesopunkt
Figure 4:2. Organizational structure of forest harvesting before Perestroika (Source:
Blandon, 1983:58)
This system had replaced an even more complicated arrangement composed of five
management levels (Blandon, 1983:51). Through its leskhoz system the predecessor of
today’s Federal Forest Service formally controlled all forest maintenance activities. The
main part of logging activities, however, were performed by lespromkhozy, i.e., state
owned logging enterprises that were assigned particular harvesting areas. As indicated
in Figure 4:2, there was also a management level between the enterprises and the central
authorities, either combines or Ob”edineniia. The latter units were larger than combines
and consisted of a large number of enterprises in a specific region. In some regions there
could also be combines that formally sorted under an Ob”edinenie. There were also a
number of combines under direct control of the Ministry.
In Arkhangelsk Oblast there was an Ob”edinenie (Arkhangel’sklesprom), a state owned
forest complex consisting of 180 enterprises, including sawmills, board factories, and
forest harvesting enterprises (lespromkhozy). At the end of the 1980s almost 134,000
people were employed by the regional forest complex (Bjorvatn & Castberg, 1994:62) .
The lespromkhoz worker brigades formed the basis of several settlements in the region.
In the “darker periods” of Soviet history these settlement were populated with a
significant number of prisoners. In fact, many lespromkhozy were once established as
prison camps. In the course of time a more flexible system was introduced where the
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workforce only stayed a couple of weeks at the logging site without actually living in
the area.
Logging operations were organized in particular lesopunkty. A lesopunkt consisted of a
fishbone pattern of lorry roads and skidder tracks where the main transportation line
ended in a landing site along a railway track, a river, or a main road. Most of the roads
were built to last for only a fairly short time. Each lesopunkt was designed to produce
(on the average) between 50 and 150 thousand m3 of wood annually, but, according to
estimates from the 1970s, a significant part of them produced amounts well above the
upper limit (Blandon, 1983:58). This practice left the new Russian Federation with “a
legacy of overuse” (World Bank, 1997:27). Earlier forest management practices have
caused local overharvesting and the need for future road construction to new but more
remote forest areas (cf. Chap. 2).
Breaking up from the old Soviet system of forest management has resulted in a poor
funding of the Federal Forest Service which has affected, for example, the level of
forest fire fighting (Nilsson et al., 1994). Many forest management units are unable to
pay wages to their employees. Around 60 percent of the funding emanates from the
budget of the Russian Federation, 30 percent from other regional sources, and 10
percent comprise a budget gap (Obersteiner, 1997:33). Pisarenko and Strakhov (1996)
report that the federal funding was around 70 percent in 1993. Since the proportion of
federal funding has decreased the Federal Forest Service and its management units (the
leskhozy) increasingly have to rely on other sources. Every leskhoz has its own budget
and they should not be engaged in commercial forestry. They are, however, allowed to
sell wood produced through so-called “commercial thinning.” Today, the leskhozy in
Arkhangelsk receive their funds from:
• the budget of the Federal Forest Service transferred via its regional establishment,
the Arkhangelsk Forest Management (Arkhangel’sk upravlenie lesami);
• the oblast budget, i.e., from the regional administration;
• their own activities, such as sanitary cutting (thinning), services, the leasing of
equipment, and 40 percent of the charges for the stumpage fees.
The new 1997 Forest Code has not significantly changed the role of the leskhozy.
However, through the Code they have been given more favorable conditions for
procuring their own funds.
The Organization of the Forest Sector in Arkhangelsk
In the previous section the general organization of the Russian forest sector was
described. In this part we concentrate on how the sector is configured in Arkhangelsk
Oblast.20
                                                
20
 Sources: Federal Forest Service of Russia, Moscow, 1997; The Forests of Arkhangelsk Region, Arkh-
angelsk, RA “KonTrust”, 1996; Welcome (illustrated magazin of Arkhangelsk region), No. 1-2, 1997, pp.
45-48; “The allocation of duties of the direction of Federal Forest Service of Russia,” Lesnaia gazeta, 28
Jan. 1993; Interviews with E.G. Tsarev (General Director of JSC “Severolesoexport”) and O.A. Nevolin
(Professor of the Forestry Department, Archangelsk State Technical University).
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Figure 4:3 indicates how the Arkhangelsk forest management is related to the federal
forest service of Russia while Figure 4:4 illustrates the organization of the regional
forest management.
Figure 4:3. The structure of the state forest authorities.
As has already been mentioned there are 28 state forest management units (leskhozy) in
the region, each one of them divided into several districts (lesnichestva). The head of
the district is a forester with higher education while the head of a forest compartment
(uchastok) is a specialist with college education. Each tending plot (obkhod) is managed
by a forest-guard who normally has an education from a special forest school.
As has been said above the Regional Forest Management (Arkhangel’sk upravlenie
lesami) is submitted to the Federal Forest Service of Russia (in Moscow) and to the
Head of the regional administration. It cooperates with the Forest department in the
administration but is not submitted to it. As can bee seen in Table 4:1 each leskhoz
manages areas of significant size.
Federal Forest Service of
Russia (Moscow)
Vodlozerskiy
(Karelian Rep.)
and Tunkinskiy
(Buriatia Rep.)
National Parks
Arkhangelsk
Regional Forest
Management
Forest
Management
“Buzulukskiy
Bor” (Orenburg
region)
Experimental
forestry “Russkiy
les” (Serpukhov)
Other
organizations
Forest Manage-
ments in oblasti,
kraii, autonomous
areas
(61 units)
Enterprises, insti-
tutions and orga-
nizations of direct
subordination
State Forest
Inventory
Enterprises
(lesoustroistvo)
(13 units)
Forest Manage ment
in the Republics of
Russia
(21 units)
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Figure 4:4. The structure of regional Forest Management
Table 4:1 The forest management system in Arkhangelsk
No.
Name of the enterprise
(leskhoz)
Number of forestry districts
(lesnichestva)
Area
(1,000 ha)
1. Arkhangel’skiy 10 1,090
2. Bereznikovskiy 10 1,150
3. Vel’skiy 12 671
4. Verkhne-Toemskiy 9 980
5. Vilegodskiy 3 305
6. Vyiskiy 5 963
7. Emetskiy 7 772
8. Kargopol’skiy 6 580
9. Karpogorskiy 8 957
10. Konoshskiy 11 961
11. Kotlasskiy 7 443
12. Krasnoborskiy 6 724
13. Leshukonskiy 7 2,677
14. Mezenskiy 10 3,733
15. Niandomskiy 8 687
16. Obozerskiy 10 742
17. Onezhskiy 12 2,197
18. Pinezhskiy 5 961
19. Plesetskiy 6 331
20. Priozerskiy 5 783
21. Puksoozerskiy 5 349
22. Severodvinskiy 4 910
Forest management
unit (leskhoz)
Arkhangelsk Regional
Forest Management
Kenozerskiy
National Park
- - - leskhozy
- - - lesnichestvaForestry district(lesnichestvo)
- - - uchastkiForest compartment(uchastok)
Forest tending plot
(obkhod) - - - obkhody
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No.
Name of the enterprise
(leskhoz)
Number of forestry districts
(lesnichestva)
Area
(1,000 ha)
23. Solovetskiy - 27
24. Surskiy 6 798
25. Ust’ianskiy 12 810
26. Kholmogorskiy 8 956
27. Shenkurskiy 11 1,037
28. Yarenskiy 9 959
Kenozerskiy National Park 2 138
Source: Arkhangelsk Forest Management (1996)
Today, there are 54 harvesting enterprises (lespromkhozy) in Arkhangelsk Oblast. These
enterprises buy timber (or they lease a forest plot) from the leskhozy at fees decided by
the Regional Forest Management. In 1992, most of these lespromkhozy were privatized
and converted into joint stock companies.
The Forest Department is one among several departments within the Regional
Administration. Formally, the Forest Department can collaborate with the privatized
forest enterprises, but it cannot decide about their activities. Naturally, the department
has close connections with other organizations, such as the Regional Forest
Management, the Union of Forest Industrialists, export companies, etc. Through its
Forest Department the Regional administration can influence the activities of forest
sector enterprises in many ways. It can, for instance:
1. determine the size of funds allocated to the forest sector in the regional budget;
2. assist in attracting new investments to the sector;
3. manage the shares belonging to the Regional administration. (However, the number
of state enterprises in the forest sector is constantly decreasing.);
4. suggest reductions in regional taxes (with the help of the Regional Deputies
Council);
5. take over shares (or emit new shares) in enterprises which have debts to the
“regional budget”, i.e., in reality affect changes in the ownership of indebted
enterprises;
6. replace the leaders of enterprises through bankruptcy procedures. This is a method
which is only rarely used because the procedure is handled by the Court of Referees
and it is rather time consuming.21
Only by looking at the list above it becomes evident that here are plenty of opportunities
to establish “personal unions” and informal relations in the business life of the region.
One example is the existence of “the Komsomol group” formed by a number of
businessmen who in former days were the regional leaders of the Young Communist
League (Komsomol).22
                                                
21
 One of the regional leaders said that it might take about five years to carry out all the bankruptcies in
forest sector of Arkhangelsk.
22
 Interview with the manager of one of the holding companies who wished to remain anonymous.
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The Arkhangelsk Regional Forest Management has 3,000 employees in the
Arkhangelsk region. It has a general responsibility for fire/disease protection,
reforestation, arrangement for forest harvesting, preparation of harvest plans and cutting
zones, evaluation of forests (fixing stumpage fees, etc.), evaluation of the quality of
harvested timber, examinations of harvested areas, decisions about penalties for
violations of rules, arrangements for replantation (including a forest tree nursery).
Permits for forest harvesting are given by the Regional Administration (via its
Department of Forestry). Leaseholders, however, decide themselves how much they
want to harvest on their leased areas. The Regional Forest Management decides how
this harvesting should be performed. Harvesting companies are required to plant new
trees after harvesting but they are paid to do this by the Regional Forest Management.
The reason for this is that (still) all forest land is owned by the state and leaseholders do
not (yet) think about themselves and act as forest owners.
The Regional Administration has a powerful position in the allocation of forest lands
through leasing. Large areas could be leased on long term contracts – up to 50 years.
The leasing price is set by the Regional Administration on the advice of the Regional
Forest Management, which estimates a “market price” for the area on the basis of
calculations performed by a department in the Northern Institute of Forest Research (cf.
below) taking climate and soil conditions, transportation costs, etc. into account.
According to information obtained from the Regional Forest Management23 the final
price agreements are then reached through an auction type of procedure.
The Regional Administration decides on stumpage fees. In the absence of a true market
price the Regional Administration acts on estimates (normativy) calculated by the
Northern Institute of Forest Research. It should be noted that some lespromkhozy have
special privileges, such as lower stumpage fees and certain state transfers to cover costs
related to the maintenance and operation of roads, schools, etc.
Forest harvesting procedures have changed considerably these last few years. Earlier
there were about 50 harvesting enterprises (lespromkhozy). Many of them have been
closed down during the transition period, others were split and new harvesting
companies have been established. Svetlozerskles is such an enterprise (see the following
box).
                                                                                                                                              
23
 Interview with Chief forest officer, Mr. D.V. Trubin of the Arkhangelsk Forest Management on October
9, 1997.
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The Lespromhkoz “Svetlozerskles”:
- Our timber is devalued, – says operator Mikhail Odegov. – It is sold dirt cheap. By whom? Our directors, managers.
Yes, I’m one of the shareholders, but my share is so small that no one cares about my opinion, and there’s actually no
time for me to express it: at 7 a.m. I’m off to the woods and return only at 11 p.m.
The situation in which operator Mikhail Odegov has found himself is characteristic of the joint stock-holding
company “Svetlozerskles” as a whole. On the one hand, this enterprise is considered the leader among scores of other
timber enterprises in the region. While several other timber-producing enterprises have come close to insolvency,
made huge debts, have next to no current assets and owe their workers monthly and even annual wages,
“Svetlozerskles” operates with stability. During the past few years it has produced 180–210 thousand cubic meters of
timber, which is in keeping with the annual allowable cut, that is, with the volume which guarantees long-term, non-
devastating forest exploitation. The lespromkhoz “Svetlozerski”, as it was called prior to becoming a joint-stock
company, was among the Soviet "shock constructions" in the 70-s and 80-s. The so-called Arkhangelsk industrial
center comprising a number of saw-mill enterprises, requiring up to 5 million cubic meters of timber plus two cellulose-
paper plants was not satisfied with the quantity of timber coming from earlier developed areas. To appease the
growing appetites of this industrial center new lespromkhozy were created along the hastily built Arkhangelsk –
Karpogori railroad: “Svetlozerski”, “Ustpokshengski”, “Siiski” and “Lukovetski”.
During the liberalization of the economy the huge communist-created centralized management system collapsed.
Gaining their independence, enterprises are carving out their own way towards the market, each in its own fashion.
“Svetlozerskles” can be considered one of the most successful.
(by Yuri Lvov)
Now, processing industries sometimes arrange their own harvesting. The Regional
Forest Management continuously evaluates the consequences of harvesting but it is
difficult to monitor and to get valid information about the new harvesting companies.
New rules are discussed that would increase the ability of the Regional Forest
Management to make such evaluations. The resources available to the Regional Forest
Management for monitoring are very scarce.24 For instance, in 1997, there was not
enough money available to monitor forest fires from the air and, consequently, there
were many small fires that developed into serious problems. Occasionally, it has been
necessary to take back decisions on leasing since harvesting companies did not function
well. However, since the companies still have to take their “social responsibility” their
leasing contracts could therefore not be cancelled. Nowadays, there are also financial
companies (regional, Moscow based, or foreign) that wish to buy harvesting rights.
Summary:
• Virtually all forests are owned and managed by the Russian Federal Forest Service
but, as in most Russian regions, virtually all forest enterprises have been privatized.
• Although most forest enterprises are privatized the forest management system in
Arkhangelsk is to a significant extent structured by the principles established in the
former Soviet Union.
• To a significant extent timber prices are set by means of administrative procedures.
                                                
24
 See previous note.
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• The forest management system is heavily centralized giving few opportunities to
adapt to local circumstances.
• Due to a relatively low profitability forest enterprises are especially affected by the
general problems of the fragile Russian market economy, e.g., ambiguities in the
legislation, poor enforcement of business rules, and the “draconian” taxation policy.
• An anti-crisis program has been initiated in order to come to terms with some of the
most acute problems. The results of these efforts are still to be assessed.
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5. The Political Profile and the Forest Sector
In terms of political preferences the population of Arkhangelsk is somewhat different
from the Russian average.25 While the communist party received 22.3 percent of the
votes in the 1995 State Duma election the corresponding figure for Arkhangelsk was
14.1 percent. Likewise, “Our Home is Russia” received a somewhat smaller support in
Arkhangelsk compared to the Federation at large. However, both for “Yabloko,” and to
a greater extent for “Women of Russia,” the situation is reversed. Thus, it could not be
argued that Arkhangelsk is significantly more “conservative” or “radical” than the rest
of Russia. For example, the ultra-conservative “Liberal Democratic Party” received
virtually the same support in Arkhangelsk as compared to the Russian average, i.e.,
around 11 percent.
Table 5:1. Result of the State Duma election in 1995. Percent.
Russia Arkhangelsk
Turnout 64.37 64.99
Communist Party 22.30 14.09
Our Home Is Russia 10.13 7.98
Liberal Democratic Party 11.18 10.84
Yabloko 6.89 7.72
Women of Russia 4.61 8.85
Communist-working Russia 4.53 2.89
Party Workers’ Self government 3.98 8.30
Russia’s Choice 3.86 4.99
Congress of Russia’s Communists 4.31 3.08
Agrarians 3.78 2.79
Derzhava 2.57 1.71
The same similarity could be found in the 1991 referendum concerning the preservation
of the Soviet Union. About the same proportion in Arkhangelsk as in the rest of the
Federation, i.e., around 71 percent, was in favor of keeping the union. However, in the
referendum in December 1993 concerning the new constitution, the population of
Arkhangelsk gave a significantly greater support (71.61%) for the new constitution than
the Russian average (55.22%). In the 1996 presidential election Arkhangelsk gave Boris
Yeltsin a considerably greater support (64.5%) than the rest of Russia (53.7%). As in
most Russian Oblasts, etc., there are a number of local parties and groups on the
political scene. In Arkhangelsk we can find the following parties:
• The Agrarian Party of Russia;
• The Democratic Party of Russia;
• The Communist Party of the Russian Federation;
                                                
25
 If not reported differently this chapter is based on the following sources: a) Political parties, social
unions in Arkhangelsk region, ed. by Y.F. Lukin, Arkhangelsk: Publishing house of Pomor University,
1995; b) Interview with Dr. M.I. Tsvetkov (Arkhangelsk State Engineering University). Data have aslo
been collected from the web pages of t he Centre for Russian Studies Database at The Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs (NUPI), URL: http://www.nupi.no/RUSSLAND/russland.htm (1 February 1999).
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• The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia;
• The People’s Party “Free Russia” (formerly the Democratic Party of Russian
Communists);
• The Democratic Choice of Russia;
• The Democratic Union of Russia;
• The Russian Christian Democratic Movement;
• The Party of Economic Freedom;
• The Republican Party of the Russian Federation;
• The Free Democratic Party of Russia (until 1991 it was the part of the Democratic
Party of Russia);
• The Socialist Workers’ Party;
• The Russian Party;
• The Party of Workers’ Self-government.
There are also a number of very small parties (orthodox communists, etc.) and even
parties like the “Party of Parents”, the “Party of Beer Lovers”, but they do not exert any
influence on the political life of the region. There are no exact data on party
membership in the region. In 1994, it varied from a few members up to 300 people
(communists, liberal democrats). Today, the situation is believed to be the same.
There is, in fact, a constant coming and going of new political parties and movements.
This is especially true during election campaigns when new groupings mushroom. A
recent example on the federal level is the Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov’s “Otechest-
vo” (Fatherland).
By looking at the relatively numerous movements and associations that exist in
Arkhangelsk one might get the impression of a vital society in terms of participation in
public affairs. However, it has been argued that huge groups know nothing about the
majority of these associations. One indication of the presumably low participation rate
is that only around 50 percent of the eligible voters in Arkhangelsk participated in the
1996 presidential election. However, in October 1997, the ASI Bulletin reported the
following which seems to indicate that the picture is mixed.
Recently a citizen’s initiative in Arkhangelsk was given legal recognition: the head of the
oblast’s administration signed a bill allowing citizens to gather and discuss general
government issues (on both the federal and local level) and also to pass resolutions
regarding decisions made by the local government. To participate in the “town meetings”
one must be 18 years of age and a legal resident of the oblast. Arkhangelsk citizens will be
able use the meetings to elect members of the local administration, to hear reports of local
government activities from deputies and administrators, and to discuss projects and
proposed legislation created by local government organs. At the meetings, citizens will
have the opportunity to meet with deputies, administrators and other members of the local
government and question them about government activities and issues. The officials will be
obliged to give answers to these questions within a month. 26
However, it can be concluded that the over-all participation is fairly low, especially on
the municipal level, where participation in some elections has been below the required
25 percent (Jacobsen, 1998:17).
                                                
26
 ASI Bulletin No. 42 October 17–23, 1997. Agentstvo sotsialnoi informatsii, Kutuzovskiy pr. 22 pod.
14a, Moscow, 121151.
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Many of the numerous organizations in Arkhangelsk are, of course, directly or
indirectly associated with political parties. To some extent it is possible to range them
from left to right, for example as follows:
Communists and sympathizers. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the
Agrarian Party of Russia, the Social Political Movement “Justice”, orthodox
communists, etc. The majority of their members are middle-aged or elderly people.
Social-patriots. For example, “State Power to the People” consists of former communist
and soviet leaders, etc.
Regional-patriots. For example, the “Pomor Consent”. The main goal of these is to
defend regional interests. Their political orientation could be said to be “left center”.
Democrats. A number of social-political movements, such as, “Democratic Revival of
the North”, Social-democrats, Christian-democrats, “Ecology of the North”, Cultural
and Educational Union “Nord”, former Komsomol leaders and others.
National-patriots. For example, “The Union of Archangel Mikhail” which joins liberal-
democrats and the “Russian National Cathedral”.
The Formal Political Structure
In Russia all bodies of local and regional power are governed by both executive and
elected (legislative) bodies. The governor (Gubernator) is the head of the regional
administration while the mayor fulfills this role on the municipal level. The mayor is
regarded as “strong” when he/she heads both the legislative and executive bodies.
However, the implementation of the Municipality Code of 1995 introducing the
principles of parliamentarism has been associated with a number of problems including
interventions by the president, etc. (Jacobsen, 1998:20 ff.).27
The components of the executive and legislative power of the Arkhangelsk Oblast are
shown in Figures 5:1 and 5:2.
                                                
27
 “Local government essentially has no power, according to Arkhangelsk Mayor Pavel Balakshin, who
also serves on the President's Council on Local Government. He argues that the federal government is not
interested in strengthening local government because effective local governments would weaken federal
power. To make local government a reality, Balakshin says federal laws must define how much tax
revenue local governments should receive. Currently, the oblast governments determine those tax issues.
He also advocated giving local governments the right to own land. Under proposed legislation, oblasts
would own land. The mayor also complained that he wanted greater power vis-a-vis the city council.”
(Pravda severa [Arkhangelsk], 25 March), IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 13, 2 April 1998:
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Figure 5:1 The structure of the regional legislative power.
Figure 5:2. The structure of the regional executive power
In Figure 5:2 we have listed the executive powers that pertain to political affairs in the
Arkhangelsk Oblast. Although there exist no formal links, for example, between the
Governor (i.e., the head of the Regional Administration) and the chairman of the
Deputies Council (the regional Duma) or the town executives it is common to describe
the relation as a formal hierarchy. This reflects the Soviet state governance system
which virtually lacked any principle of local self-government in the normal sense of the
word. It is also close at hand to believe that this image of a hierarchy, in fact, reflects
the contemporary “rules of the game.” The following story from Pravda Severa seems
to indicate this:
The long-running scandal surrounding the selection of the Arkhangelsk Oblast
commissioner on human rights is finally winding down. The scandal began on 2 October
1997, when the oblast legislature appointed the governor’s deputy and chief of staff, Oleg
Petrov, as human rights commissioner. The public responded with outrage and protest, and
some civil rights groups appealed to the procuracy, claiming the rules of procedure were
Head of the Regional Administration, Governor (elected)
Head of the Regional Government and Chairman of the regional Duma
Heads of the Regional Government Assistants
Departments (for the various sectors of the economy)
Town and district administrations
Village and settlements’ executive power organs
Deputies’ commissions
Chairman of Deputies Council and two assistants
(elected by the Council)
Deputies Council (the Regional Duma, 35 persons)
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violated during the selection process: The legislative session ended earlier than planned,
and Petrov’s opponents were never given a chance to address the body.
Additionally, a very important provision was omitted from the text of the oblast law on the
human rights commissioner that had been widely published in the media. The omitted
provision stipulates that the legislature’s committees, with public consultation could
nominate candidates. In the published version of the law, only the governor could nominate
candidates. Few believed that was a simple typo, but the oblast procuracy decided there had
been no conspiracy. However, the procurator officially protested and the full text of the law
was finally published, after which the legislators reconvened for their winter session and
revoked Petrov’s appointment.28
The Existence of a “Forest Lobby”?
The Arkhangelsk Regional Duma has 35 deputies, only a few of which have been
elected as representatives of political parties. There exists a powerful forest lobby that
dominates the Duma as well as the Department of Forestry in the Regional
Administration. For example, the head of the Department of Forestry is also a member
of the Union of Forest Industrialists. Earlier he was a senior engineer in one of the
larger pulp and paper plants.29 Another senior engineer is now the chairman of the Duma
committee on industry, construction, and infrastructure. This person, a director of a
forest enterprise, is also elected chairman of the “Union of Archangel Mikhail,” which
is a local organization of producers. As chairman of the committee he has worked a lot
with taxation issues.30 As a result the Regional Duma reduced some special taxes of
importance for small enterprises, such as the tax on capital (equipment, buildings), the
road tax (which is 3.4% on turnover). Many of these persons sit on several chairs – they
“have many hats”, as the Russians would say. The self-interest is by no means hindered
by any constitutional arrangement. In fact, these individuals can often benefit personally
from the confused situation and the jurisdiction in which they operate is somewhat
unclear.
The Duma is elected as a “regional” parliament but the Regional Administration is the
“long arm” of the state. Formally, however, it is not the executive of the regional
parliament. But, as we have exemplified, roles are sometimes confused by the existence
of personal unions, and other non-formal arrangements. In many of our interviews
respondents talk about a “forest family” consisting of The Regional Duma, the
Department of Forestry of the Regional Administration and the Union of Forest
Industrialists. Together they prepared a crisis program which was adopted by the Duma
and the Regional Administration in 1996. This document played a very important role in
the election campaign since the main part of the population in the region is dependent
on the forest sector. However, the program had nothing to say about small business,
something that might reflect the position of the big-enterprise forest lobby.
                                                
28
 IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 8, 26 February 1998 (Internet Edition). (Gleb Tiurin in
Arkhangelsk, who is the author of this note, mentions the following sources for his story: Arkhangelsk, 21
February; Pravda Severa, 18 February; Pomorye TV, 19 February.)
29
 When this report was finalized the Head of the Department of Forestry had left his position to become
General Director of the Solombala sawing and woodworking combine.
30
 Based on interviews conducted with representatives from the regional Duma, October 9, 1997
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For example, on October 9, 1998, the Democratic Movement (led by the deputy
chairman of the Duma Finance Committee) organized a seminar to review the results of
the “anti-crisis program.” No one from the “forest family” came to this meeting. The
directors of the big enterprises concentrate on relations with the Regional
Administration rather than with the new democratic movement. During the meeting it
was concluded that the anti-crisis program had been designed in a way that prevented
the assessment of its results. Formally, however, it was possible for the Regional
Administration to conclude that the program had produced intended effects. Some 10
new regional laws were passed on the basis of the program. Whether or not these laws
have really changed the situation in any respect was not even discussed. The part of the
program devoted to the forest sector resulted in some new laws allowing tax reductions
for certain companies. Formally this is a concrete effect, but in reality the law did not
change anything (even according to the directors themselves).
The large enterprises in the region have huge debts to the regional budget (hundred
millions of rubles). This sum is constantly increasing due to penalties for not paying on
time, etc. Consequently, bankruptcy should become a prominent feature in the
economy, something that would lead to a debt restructuring. The head of the
Department of Forestry in the Regional Administration, has suggested that the entire
debt should be reconstructed. Some enterprises should be exempted from penalties,
some should be allowed to pay during 5–10 years, some should be closed down
permanently (which in many cases should have happened years ago). Those in favor of
radical changes argue that the problem is that the “red directors”, who are still in charge
of most of the large enterprises, do not understand the idea behind the market reforms
and are unable comprehend what is going on.31
The general situation in which many forest enterprises find themselves can, once again,
be illustrated by the lespromkhoz Svetlozerskles although this enterprise might be in a
better position that its fellow companies (see the following box).
                                                
31
 To clarify whether this opinion reflects the reality would require more investigations. See Mashkina,
1998, for a suggestion on how such an investigation might be conducted.
50
The Lespromhkoz “Svetlozerskles”:
The company owes nothing to the regional and local budgets, wages are paid in due time and they are among the
highest in the timber industry. But, on the other hand, a serious threat is impending: that of coercive extraction of
a federal tax debt and a surtax dragging on from as far as 1996. The current payments into the federal budget are
made in time, but the fines for delayed payments keep growing. Out of the approximately 20 million rubles (in new
currency) received from the realization of output, about 5 million rubles go into the state coffers. Still the enterprise
remains a debtor. In 1996, the Interdepartmental arrears commission went so far as to attempt to bring bankruptcy
action against “Svetlozerskles”, but it passed without consequences as it was evident that this enterprise is
solvent and quite capable of functioning.
In 1997, the “Svetlozerskles” directors attempted to take advantage of the situation to reconstruct the debts. In
March of the same year a government act permitted a delay in tax payments if the enterprise carries out an
emission of shares, if 50 percent of the shares plus one pass over to state property. Simultaneously fines would
keep growing. “Svetlozerskles” rejected this variant. From the forestry department of the region, it is said that only
a few enterprises in Russia took advantage of the government proposed restructuring. In former years the
enterprise produced timber with home made machines (LP-49), which were unreliable in exploitation and caused
great harm to the forests. Finally, the natural resource authorities forbade using them. Later new felling machines
(LP-19) were purchased. The most substantial purchases of the past few years were felling machines “Timber
Jack-618” and three self-loading skidders of the same “Timber Jack” company. Buying foreign-made machines
exerted great financial demands on the enterprise. They were connected not only with paying for the equipment
proper, but also with covering the huge customs fees, which e.g. amounted to 100 percent of the skidder prices,
as in our practice they are not considered technological, but transport means. Nevertheless the enterprise took
these expenses upon itself and today 70 percent of the harvested volumes is produced by machines and 30
percent by hand-operated chain-saws. Limbing and loading long-tailed timber on trucks is done by home-made
machines, which, as the director considers, meet the demands of the enterprise to the full.
Prior to privatization the enterprise had 600 workers. The number was not economically justifiable. They had
to down-size to 370. As Alexander Trenin put it, the number of workers “was brought into accord with production
volumes and the market situation”. This naturally caused deterioration in social welfare and services in the Svetlyi
settlement: unemployed persons appeared for whom there simply were no other jobs to be had.
(by Yuri Lvov)
So far the typical reaction when an enterprises becomes insolvent has been the
following:
1. The first method is to convert the debts into shares in the debtor enterprise. These
shares can also be “bought” by the authorities. In this way authorities increase their
share in the newly privatized businesses. This institutional circumstance has caused
a counter current that can be labeled “deprivatization” (cf. Carlsson & Olsson,
1998:63 ff.).
2. An external leadership is established. Generally, this person is someone (a
bureaucrat) with a personal interests in the business. His task is not to reconstruct
the enterprise but to make it function independently of any profitability requirement.
In practice, actual liquidation does not exist.
3. The third solution is just to let the debts grow, with a resulting increase of barter
trade (cf. Aukutsionek, 1998; Gaddy & Ickes, 1998). This seems to be the main
solution.
This situation is preserved because the Duma is largely populated with people who are
stakeholders in many of  the enterprises in question.
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In the next section we shall discuss how the forest enterprises of Arkhangelsk Oblast are
organized and what problems are associated with this organization.
Summary:
• In terms of political preferences the political profile of the Arkhangelsk Oblast does
not significantly deviate from the Russian average.
• Although organizations are numerous popular participation is low, especially at the
local political level.
• The forest sector plays an important role on the regional political scene. There exists
an informal alliance – an influential “forest family” – consisting of The Regional
Duma, the Department of Forestry of the Regional Administration and the Union of
Forest Industrialists.
• Forest enterprises have huge debts to the regional budget and in combination with
the fact that jurisdictions are unclear and that many officials are stakeholders in the
industry, political efforts are often designed at temporary alleviations of day to day
problems caused by the lack of a proper market mechanisms.
• Since a significant part of the population is literally dependent on the survival of the
forest industries they are likely to give support to individual members of the “forest
family” pleading for temporary remedies rather than those which favor long-term
changes of the sector.
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6. Forest Enterprises in Arkhangelsk Oblast
In this section the forest enterprise sector in Arkhangelsk is briefly described.32
In accordance with a Presidential decree (No. 1392) from 16 November 1992 holding
companies were introduced at the intermediary level between the central Roslesprom
and individual enterprises in the Russian forest sector (Romanov, 1995). However, the
decree was implemented in various ways in different regions. In general, the process of
establishing these holdings seems to have been very slow, but a number of them were
eventually established in Arkhangelsk as well, some of which are still in operation, such
as:
• Severoles (the largest holding comprising 36 enterprises);
• Kotlasles;
• Vel’skles;
• Nauchdrevprom (on the basis of the Central Scientific-Research Institute of
Mechanical Wood Processing (TsNIIMOD);
• Severnaya tsellyuloza (Northern Pulp); and
• Konoshales.
These holding companies joined together a number of harvesting enterprises, sawmills,
etc. However, the holding companies were never able to fulfill the intentions of the
authorities. They were mainly used to take over shares which belonged to the state (the
Regional Administration, etc.). This construction has been described as a “dead-born
child” of the first period of property redistribution. In practice, these holding companies
only exist “on paper”. 33
After this failure a new holding company called Solombalales was established in 1997.
The company joined the large Solombala Pulp and Paper mill with all its suppliers. The
new company aims at reducing the total cost of pulp and to make its business more
competitive. The company supports harvesting enterprises where they invest in new
technology, it provides good credits, etc.
In 1991–92, practically all forest enterprises in Arkhangelsk were privatized. Only five
small enterprises remained state owned and in the absence of a “coordinating structure”
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 If not reported differently this section is based on the following sources:
a) The official list of leaders of regional forest sector enterprises.
b) Lvov, Yu. “Vse my v odnoi sviazke” (We are all in the same boat). Gazeta ATK, weekly newspaper of the Arkhangelsk
telecompany, No. 48 (105), Dec. 6, 1997, p.1-2. (Interview with Prof. Alexander V. Plastinin, chairman of the board of the
Solombalski TsBK.)
c) Popov, I. “Otrubilis’, ottorgovalis’ – poslednie shchepki na eksport letiat” (They cut down and bargained out – the last slivers
are flying off to export), Komersant’ Daily, No. 106, June 10, 1994.
d) V. Bardin, K. Smirnov. “MVES stremitsia sdelat’ soiuzy eksporterov svoimi soiuznikami” (The Ministry of External Economic
Affairs tries to make the Unions of Exporters its allies), Komersant’ Daily, No. 110, June, 17, 1994.
e) Popov. I. “MVES budet kontrolirovat’ eksport po-novomu” (The Ministry of External Economic Affairs will use the new
method of export control), Komersant’ Daily, No. 111, June,18, 1994.
f) Popov. I. “Lesoeksportery nachnut torgovat’ kak priniatno v Germanii” (The forest exporters start to do trade as they do in
Germany), Komersant’ Daily, No. 113, June,22, 1994.
g) Kologreev S.F. Potoki lesnykh gruzov iz Arkhangelskoi oblasti (Flows of forest products leaving Arkhangelsk Oblast), JSC
“Severolesoexport”, Paper presented at an international conference on marketing held in Arkhangelsk in November 1997.
h) Interviews with E.G. Tsarev (General Director of “Severolesoexport”), A.A. Kalinin (Chairman, Union of Forest Industrialists
and Director, Lesobank), A.I. Orlov (Union of Forest Manufactures), A.V. Plastinin (Chairman of the Board, JSC “Solombala
Pulp and Paper mill” and Professor of the Arkhangelsk State Engineering University), N.I. Pavlovskaya (Vice-Director of
Sawmill No. 3), S.F. Pavlov (JSC “Severolesoexport”).
33
 Interview with the Chairman of the Union of Forest Industrialists and Director of Lesobank, Mr. A.
Kalinin, October 8, 1997.
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forest enterprise directors “came together” to create a forum for “intra-region regulation
and coordination.”34 The Arkhangelsk Union of Forest Industrialists is a corporate
organization with about 30 members.35  Members are physical persons (mainly
enterprise directors, etc). The Union was established as a “successor” to
Arkhangelsklesprom, the former state forest complex with its 180 enterprises.
The Union lobbies the regional and federal administration where it tries to influence
financial issues, taxation, legislation, pricing policies, etc. Although it has a corporate
character it is often described as a public organization. The board consists of nine
members mainly from forest enterprises. However, among its members one also finds
the head of the Forest Department of the Regional administration, the leader of the
Trade Union of Foresters, and the director of the floating office. The chairman of the
board is also the director of Lesobank, the most important bank in the Arkhangelsk
forest sector. The bank was established in 1994 to facilitate the funding of investments
and business in the Arkhangelsk forest sector. Lesobank is owned by 34 enterprises.36
As was mentioned earlier, during Soviet times, Arkhangelsk was the dominating timber
producing region in the country. About 12 percent of the total timber export from the
Soviet Union came from Arkhangelsk, the region contributed 25 percent of the total
Soviet timber production and 30 percent of its cellulose was produced in Arkhangelsk.
The Arkhangelsk forest sector has always been export oriented but earlier all exports
were handled by Moscow. Still today, some of it goes via Moscow, but the main part
goes directly from the companies in the region to their destination abroad.
Quite recently a regional Union of Forest Exporters was organized. It has nine
members, JSC Severolesoexport and a number of Arkhangelsk sawmills. As mentioned
in Chapter 2 there are 156 exporters of lumber in the Arkhangelsk region, but of these
only around 20 are skilled and qualified in export trade. This was the reason for
establishing the new organization. The main forest exporter in the region is JSC Severo-
lesoexport. The enterprise was established during the Soviet period by the 17 main
sawmills in the region. Now it is a joint stock company. Severolesoexport is a member
of both the Union of Forest Industrialists and the Rosekportles37 in Moscow and it has
close relations with JSC Exportles (which owns 30% of the shares of Severolesoexport
while Severolesoexport has 7% of the shares of Exportles). The main activities of
Severolesoexport are shown in the Figure 6:1.
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 See note 32.
35
 The exact name of this union is “The Union of Employers of the Timber Industry Complex of
Arkhangelsk Region” (Soiuz rabotodateli lesnogo kompleksa Arkhangel’skoi oblasti).
36
 Information about Lesobank can be found on the bank’s web page at URL: http://www.lesobank.ru
37
 Rosekportles is a subsidiary organization of Roslesprom, which in the beginning of the transition period
became what has been described as a “quasi-state committee”. Athough being a commercial actor
Roslesprom was also given the right to issue export quotas while Rosekportles was the central export
agency. (For a description and analysis of the development of these units, see Lembruch, 1998:35 ff.)
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Figure 6:1. Activities of Severolesoeksport
Until quite recently both Exportles and Rosekportles had branch organizations in
Arkhangelsk. Now all of them have disappeared. The policy of the Ministry of External
Economic Affairs has been to establish special export cartels, but it is not clear to what
extent the ministry has been able to control developments in the sphere of exports.38
The structure of the Arkhangelsk forest sector is currently in a state of continuous
change. Many enterprises (especially small ones) appear and disappear all over the
region. The gathering of data about new enterprises (established after 1991) is the
subject of a special investigation and is expected to take a long time.39
A major problem for the forest sector in the region is the insufficient supply of raw
materials. So, the enterprises have to make special agreements with state forestry
organizations (leskhozy) concerning cutting areas and restoration of wood, fires, etc. For
instance, during the Soviet period, Sawmill No. 3 was the best sawmill in the region. At
the beginning of the 1990s it established the company “Promles, Ltd”, which joined a
number of harvesting enterprises. The sawmill had no problems with timber until 1995,
when the economic situation got worse. Now, Sawmill No. 3 has huge debts and is
practically bankrupt.40 “Promles, Ltd” has been closed down. Some of the harvesting
enterprises (belonging to “Promles”) joined the Solombalales holding company. This
picture is rather typical. There is a “battle” between forest enterprises for good
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 The pros and cons of these coordination efforts were discussed in the press during 1994 (cf. for instance
articles in Kommersant’ DAILY, June 10, 17, 18, 22 1994). For a critical discussion of the development of
Russian forest (export) organizations 1992–1996, see Lehmbruch (1998).
39
 Interview with the Chairman of the Union of Forest Manufacturers and Director of Lesobank, Mr. A.
Kalinin, October 8, 1997.
40
 The financial crisis of August 1998 helped Sawmill No. 3 in that it increased the ruble value of its
exports. The critical situation of this enterprise – as in some other forest enterprises, like e.g.
Maimaksanski Sawing Woodworking Combine – actually improved through the 1998 financial crisis.
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suppliers. Every sawmill tries to have its “own” suppliers among the harvesting
enterprises.
Sometimes payments for timber purchases is done through the provision of (often not
very modern) harvesting machinery, etc. In addition to these “traditional” suppliers
there are a great number of small harvesting and trading intermediaries which sell small
amounts of timber (less then 1,000 m3). The lespromkhoz called Svetlozerskles is one of
the enterprise that has to cope with the problems and which deliberately has tried to
refine its management methods (see box below).
The Lespromhkoz “Svetlozerskles”:
An important measure was the change to 100 percent bucking on the enterprise’s own sites. While a state enterprise
the lespromkhoz fulfilled the orders of high standing authorities by dispatching half of the timber to consumers long-
tailed, without any sorting. When the enterprise became independent, its management considered that by increasing
its own bucking capacities the enterprise could partially alleviate the problem of down-sizing in the first place and,
besides, make additional profits from selling its produce, the price of assorted goods being higher than that of long-
tailed timber. At present bucking on three bucking lines in two shifts a day produces up to a thousand cubic meters of
saw logs and pulpwood.
Consistently introducing measures to make more efficient use of materials and resources meant that the company
had to revise other stereotypes enrooted in the Soviet period as well. For example, it was considered that timber-
harvesting should be carried out the year around, proceeding from the simple argument that each Soviet citizen should
be provided with a job twelve months a year excluding a three-week vacation.
Two-track plank roads were built into the most inaccessible marshy parts of the region. Along such roads timber
trucks resembling railway trains pushed forward tens of kilometers. These roads required a huge amount of the best
timber, man force, and expenditure. That is why, when the opportunity appeared to solve such problems
independently, the director set a new task: 85 percent of the annual volume of timber-cutting was to be done in the
winter period. This would make it possible at minimum expenditure to drive timber out of remote areas along temporary
winter roads as soon as the swamps are covered with thick layers of ice and snow.
This does not mean that road-building has been completely stopped since production sites are scattered over
vast territories and there has never been a normal transportation system. In the summer months a part of the
workers relieved from the winter logging sites is engaged in road-building and repairing, others in the overhauling
of machinery, some take vacations. Tractors and machines are hired out, for example to the forest management
to carry out silvicultural works.
(by Yuri Lvov)
The Social Responsibilities of the Forest Sector 41
The forest sector can be described as a “closed” process, totally dependent on timber
harvesting. As we have seen, during the last five years total harvesting in Arkhangelsk
Oblast decreased by two thirds. It is significant that only about 30 percent of the
existing production capacity is used. When wood prices fell on the world market and the
state introduced currency restrictions a large part of the enterprises became unprofitable.
As a consequence all financing must come out of the work performed by the enterprises
themselves. The state investment policy is strict and it might take 9–12 months before
the State pays out the credits given to enterprises.
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 If not reported differently the source for this section is Arkhangelsk Oblast (1997).
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Another problem is the seasonal character of the sector. Seventy percent of the
harvesting is done during the winter. According to the director of Arkhangelsk
Lesobank most enterprises have debts, but to enforce a strict bankruptcy policy would in
practice not improve the situation. That would often mean that whole villages or small
towns would die since they are entirely dependent upon a single leskhoz or lespromkhoz.
It is therefore necessary to find more “civilized” forms for solving the problem. Most
actors believe that the only possibility is restructuring and reorganization. In such
restructurings, debts might be “paid” for by shares in the debtor company. This is also
true for the state, which again might become the main shareholder in recently privatized
enterprises. This is, in fact, a countercurrent to the official movement towards
privatization.
Investments by foreign companies (mostly German and French) are the only available
alternative today since, in the present turbulent situation, foreign technology
(machinery) must be pre-paid by Russian enterprises. Long term investors are not
attracted due to ambiguities in the legislation which make forecasts of future
developments difficult or impossible.
In 1996, the activities of the Arkhangelsk forest sector enterprises resulted in a loss of
479.5 billion rubles (an increase of more than 250 percent compared to the previous
year). During the first five months of 1997 the loss amounted to 194.6 billion rubles. In
1997 there were 38 profitable and 98 unprofitable enterprises with total debts of 2.62
trillion rubles (511.59 billion were debts to the state budget). Only 5 percent of all forest
enterprises operate at a standard liquidity ratio, 7 percent have a liquidity ratio close to
standard. The remaining 88 percent are practically bankrupt. The existing tax system is
unacceptable for forest enterprises (especially for harvesting enterprises). A majority of
these enterprises have no working capital with which to buy raw materials, fuel, new
equipment, etc. The capital stocks has been depreciated to more than 50 percent (57% in
harvesting, 50% in woodworking, 57% in the pulp and paper sector). The existing
customs rules make the acquisition of modern foreign technology practically
impossible.
One of the main obstacles for a fast restructuring of the forest sector is the “social
responsibility” that still rests with the enterprises. In areas dominated by raw material
based production the “social sector” (education, health care, child care, etc.) is largely
maintained by the enterprises. In fact, sometimes these enterprises constitute the
economic basis for whole communities. Thus, single enterprises might provide
fuelwood, housing, day care, etc. in the areas in which they operate. These engagements
contribute to making the crisis in the forest sector even deeper. In Arkhangelsk, the
engagement by the enterprises of the forest sector in the social sphere can be illustrated
by the following facts (as of Jan. 1, 1997):
- Provision of housing 2127.45 m2
- Kindergartens 40 units
- Schools 15 units
- Clubs 77 units
- Baths 108 units
- Other facilities 264 units
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In 1996, the cost of the above arrangements was 203.4 billion rubles. Harvesting
enterprises, like the lespromkhoz Svetlozerskles, are also involved in providing social
services (see box below).
The Lespromhkoz “Svetlozerskles”:
Following the break-down of the Soviet centralized system of ORS-s (otdely rabochego snabzheniia – departments
providing for workers’ needs in food and clothing), commercial trading appeared in the settlements. But it could not
meet the demands of the population, since stores specialized in selling only the most profitable goods – alcohol,
cigarettes, sweets. At the same time the Arkhangelsk pulp and paper plant, the main consumer of “Svetlozerskles”
pulpwood, came out with proposals to substitute food staples for money as payment – for many months the plant had
not been able to transfer any money to the lespromkhoz to pay for wood deliveries. (The plant itself got these staples
on a barter basis in payment for its produce on the domestic market and in the countries of the former Soviet Union).
That is how in “Svetlozerskles” the idea emerged to create special trade services, including a few stores, a bakery and
a cafeteria. Since the local authorities, also experiencing a financial deficit, had not for months paid salaries to budget
dependents – teachers and doctors – the following resourceful scheme was invented: “budget dependents” get food
staples and other goods free of charge at the enterprise stores while in the local budget a corresponding sum is taken
down as the enterprise’s payments of local taxes.
“Live money” is a term which industrialists and financiers have begun making ample use of ever since money
accounts have been replaced by bills of exchange, barter and mutual agreement accounting, that is replacing "live
money" with substitutes. For the year 1997 "Svetlozerskles" received only 31 percent of the total sum of its sold
produce. All the rest came either in the form of substitutes or natural exchange, among which fuel and food products
come first. That is why it was easier for the enterprise to square accounts with the local and regional budgets than with
the federal, which acknowledges only money transactions.
As compared to numerous other enterprises in this field, which rushed “to rid themselves” of Soviet-period
agricultural subsidiaries, “Svetlozerskles” has retained its agricultural production and is taking good care of it. It has a
highly mechanized farm with automatic feeding-troughs and milking machines, an automatic diesel power station, hay
warehouses and other structures and agricultural technology five million rubles worth. Thirteen farm workers, including
two managers, not shunning manual labor either, maintain and provide for 135 heads of cattle. In 1997, the farm
produced 80 tons of milk and 10 tons of meat. In the winter they sell whole milk, while during summertime the milk is
processed into cream, cottage cheese and other produce. Under local conditions producing agricultural products is
paying only on specialized farms with elite cattle or if conducted by farmers who combine field-crop cultivation with
commercial activity. “Svetlozerskles” not only reaps no profit from its farm, but subsidizes about 180 thousand rubles
annually. But still Alexander Trenin puts forward arguments in favor of maintaining the agricultural section.
The agricultural section provides inhabitants of Verkhnaya Palenga with jobs. There is no other possibility of
employment for them. The produce of the farm is of higher quality than that which is brought from other places and it is
always fresh. Besides, the farm land provides people with plots where enterprise workers can grow potatoes and
vegetables for their own needs, harvest hay for their cows. The farm also provides the plot-farmers with fertilizers at a
low price and they can rent transport and agricultural implements. The milk and meat sold by the subsidiary farm is
sold to its workers at prices lower than cost price. In a small eating house on a cutting site, situated in the forest at 40
kilometers from the settlement, the workers get hot meals practically free of charge – they only have to pay 3 rubles.
Dwelling houses and all so-called social objects formerly owned by the lespromkhoz and maintained through an
increase in the cost-price of the enterprise’s produce were handed over to the local municipal authorities. But the
district and settlement administration has neither the strength nor the means to maintain buildings and equipment in a
normal condition. The heating system installed hastily with a harsh violation of technology defunctions: it is cold in
many an apartment in the winter. No one in the village is responsible for garbage disposal. People with complaints do
not turn to the local administration but to the director of the timber enterprise. That is what they have grown
accustomed to. I witnessed such a scene; in front of the office building entrance the director’s car was encircled by
some 20 women petitioners. Alexander Trenin heard them out patiently, promising to help. Later in his office he
regretted the fact: people have grown used to relying on the state, they do not want to do anything themselves, they do
not even clean up their own rubbish. And many of them no longer even work for the lespromkhoz.
(by Yuri Lvov)
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General Problems in Forest Sector
Arkhangelsk is located in the far north with harsh winters and frozen waters. For its
export the sector is dependent on ice free harbors.42 Due to high prices of icebreaking,
forest sector enterprises cannot perform export operations all the year around. This fact
has made the financial situation more problematic and it has increased “mutual debts”
between forest sector enterprises. In addition, most machine building enterprises,
producing complicated wood and woodworking equipment, are practically bankrupt.
Since 1993, there has been virtually no investments allocated to forest related scientific-
research institutes and organizations. Although the volumes of manufacturing have
decreased there has not been any corresponding reduction of workers and employees.
Hidden unemployment now exceeds the official level by 3-4 times. The high level of
labor costs in the total costs of forest products might be a consequence of this fact.
Another problem is that the restructuring of the forest sector has not been particularly
successful, because a majority of the enterprises in the region are large and medium
sized. New financial and industrial actors prefer to rent existing enterprises or to buy
shares in such enterprises, but they do not want to invest money in the rebuilding of
them. According to the official policy, as it is revealed in the anti-crisis program of
Arkhangelsk region (Arkhangelsk Oblast, 1997), the forest sector has to cope with the
following problems:
• to eliminate unprofitable enterprises;
• to concentrate people and technical resources in profitable enterprises;
• to introduce a “shift method” in harvesting and achieving a resettlement of the
population;
• to attract new foreign and Russian investments in order to introduce modern
equipment and technology, new types of products;
• to find new markets for forest products inside Russia and abroad;
• to concentrate the shares of forest enterprises in the hands of the regional
administration in order to exert influence on their management, especially
concerning their sales policy. (Since the majority of forest enterprises have large
debts to the regional budget – about 400 billion rubles – they can issue additional
shares and give them to the administration as payments for their debts.)
• to adopt a regional law on “Property use for making seasonal and safety stocks”;
• to abolish taxes on motor vehicles to be used in the production process;
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 Sources for this section: Arkhangelsk Oblast (1996); Arkhangelsk Oblast (1997); Tsarev E.G. (1996);
“Meropriiatii po stabilizatsii raboty predpriiatii lesopromyshlennogo kompleksa Arkhangel’skoi oblasti v
1996 gody. Proekt” (Measures to stabilize work of the enterprises in the forest industrial complex of
Arkhangelsk Oblast in 1996, Draft). (This document was worked out in the Regional Adminstration to
President Yeltsin’s visit to Arkhangelsk, but the recommendations were not implemented.); “Osnovnye
napravleniia v rabote predpriiatii i organizatsii lesopromyshlennogo kompleksa na 1997-1998 gody.
Prilozhenie 2, Odobreno resheniem kollegii Goskomlesproma Rossii ot 15 ianvaria 1997 g.” (Main
directions in the work of enterprises and organizations in the forest industrial complex for 1997-1998.
Appendix 2, Approved by the extended collegium of Goskomlesprom Russia on 15 January 1997). This
Committee was abolished and most of its decisions were never implemented.)
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• to reduce the rate of property taxes;
• to change the use of the territorial road fund;
• to finish the transfer of the social sphere to the local administrations;
• to coordinate the list of paid services in forestry;
• to elaborate a system of registration of “mutual debts” between the forest enterprises
and the transport and energy sectors.
In order to solve these problems several regional laws and decrees were adopted during
1996–1997. Merely by scanning this list of decisions it becomes obvious that the
majority of them have an ad hoc character and have to do with tax relief, delays of tax
payments, measures to increase tax discipline, etc.43 The anti-crisis program for the
forest sector is of course more elaborated and future-oriented. According to the opinion
of the director of JSC “Severolesoexport” the main goals of this program can be
described as follows (Tsarev, 1996):
• to achieve a 4–5 fold increase in incomes from wood bought by customers outside
the Arkhangelsk region;
• to determine limits for pulp production according to the ecological situation and ask
Komi Republic and Vologda region to take the same measures;
• to reduce taxes for profitable enterprises;
• to restrict transport tariffs for forest products inside the Arkhangelsk region;
• to create a Forest Sector Support Fund with money obtained through the value
added tax. To use this fund for scientific-research works, new equipment,
technology, products, utilization of waste products, etc.
• to exempt leskhozy and lespromkhozy from road tax and tax for owners of means of
transport (technological);
• to find new external investments, especially in harvesting enterprises;
• to determine the annual lower price limit to round timber and all kinds of chip;
• to create a Regional Union of Forest Products Exporters and to stop the export of
round timber.
In the next section we shall see to what extent the above intentions and efforts are
reflected at the individual enterprise level. By looking at the actual behavior of
individual forest enterprises it will be clarified to what extent the general problems
described in the previous sections, in fact, compel them to act in a “market oriented”
way. This will establish a foundation for the final discussion concerning the hurdles and
prospects for developing a sustainable forest sector.
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 Source: List prepared by The Arkhangelsk Union of Forest Industrialists.
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Summary:
• The forest sector of Arkhangelsk is heavily export oriented.
• The export is handled by local agents and Moscow based export agencies play a
minor role.
• Deliberate efforts have been made to reorganize the forest enterprises in holding
companies but these efforts have failed. Recently new attempts have been made.
• The supply of wood is a problem and as a consequence harvesting companies,
sawmills, etc., try to establish their own direct ties to individual wood suppliers,
such as leskhozy or lespromkhozy.
• The social engagements of forest sector enterprises is significant and something that
delays rather than promotes the unavoidable restructuring of the sector.
• Recently an anti-crisis program has been initiated in order to alleviate the most
urgent problems in the sector.
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7. Business Behavior
In order to give a more specific and refined picture of the Arkhangelsk forest sector we
have to pay some attention to the behavior of individual firms. This is the task of the
present chapter. The analysis is based on structured interviews with a stratified sample
of 31 forest enterprises. These data are compared with data on 156 firms from six other
Russian regions.44 Since it can be assumed that a number of macro-economic variables
have a general effect on all Russian enterprises irrespective of their location, it is
essential to have some point of reference. For this purpose the same framework has
been used for interviewing 25 forest enterprises in Northern Sweden. Thus, the
Arkhangelsk material can be compared to the rest of Russia as well as to a sample of
Swedish forest firms – the latter embedded in a well established market environment.
The 31 Arkhangelsk firms in our data set employ close to 24 thousand people, or around
30 percent of the workforce in the regional forest sector. The enterprises vary in size
from eight employees to almost eight thousand, the median firm has around 400
employees. The majority of the firms (23 out of 31) are formerly state owned
enterprises that are now owned by private actors, five enterprises are still state owned
and only two could be regarded as genuinely new private enterprises. Six of the 31 firms
have established joint ventures with foreign owners.
Most of the firms (60%) should be considered processing industries. The typical firm in
our sample is an enterprise that does saw-milling in combination with some other type
of processing, such as dressing. Eleven of the enterprises basically produce roundwood,
nine sawnwood, and three pulp.
Production
It should be noted that while production in the interviewed firms has dropped by around
44 percent during the last five years, employment has decreased by only about 24
percent, which indicates inadequate restructuring efforts. The same pattern was found in
a study by Nilsson and Shvidenko (1998).
In the following two diagrams changes in employment and production for 25 of the 31
interviewed Arkhangelsk firms are related to an estimate of productivity change
(production volume in tons or cubic meters related to the number of employees in 1998
and 1993).45 In that way the diagrams indicate restructuring efforts manifested in
changes in the competitive position of the Arkhangelsk firms during the last five-year
period.
As shown in diagram 7.1, totally 9 of the 25 firms have been able to maintain or
increase their productivity since 1993 (i.e. those above 1 on the vertical axis). Only one
of them has at the same time increased its employment. Six of the 25 firms expose a
market behavior similar to that of a typical western forest enterprise, i.e., they decrease
                                                
44
 Other regions in our study are: the Karelian Republic, the Murmansk, Moscow, Tomsk, and Irkutsk
Oblasti, and Krasnoyarsk and Khabarovsk Kraii. (At the time of writing data from Murmansk and Karelia
were still missing.)
45
 Six leskhozy were left out of this comparison. A leskhoz should be considered a public authority rather
than an enterprise operating in the emerging Russian market economy.
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employment and increase productivity. From diagram 7.1 could also be concluded that
15 of the companies find themselves in a very difficult position of stagnating or
decreasing productivity as well as decreasing employment. Three firms have even
increased their employment despite decreasing productivity.
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Diagram 7:1. Employment change related to productivity change in 25 forest
enterprises in Arkhangelsk 1993–1998
In diagram 7.2, productivity changes are related to the changes in production volumes
among 25 companies. Productivity decreases are obviously heavily dependent on the
large reductions in production that have taken place during recent years in most Arkh-
angelsk forest companies. The simple cubic regression applied fits well to observed
changes (Rsq 0.83) among the firms with decreasing production (i.e., those below 1.0
on the horizontal axis in diagram 7:2). The possibilities to reduce employment at the
same rate as production decreases seem to have been limited in most companies. As
shown in the diagram only one of the firms has been able to increase productivity along
with a decreasing production volume.
From the two diagrams above we can conclude that the forest sector decline is more
severe in Arkhangelsk than the analysis in previous chapters have indicated. Only about
seven of the 25 companies in our data set seem to have started a restructuring and
transition process in a market oriented direction.
63
Production change
2.01.51.0.50.0
Pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
ch
an
ge
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0.0
Rsq = 0.8327
thru origin
Diagram 7:2. Production change related to productivity change in 25 forest enterprises
in Arkhangelsk 1993–1998
Wood Supply
In earlier chapters we have demonstrated how production of wood has dropped over the
transition period. We have also indicated that there might be problems to acquire wood,
especially for larger firms. The main providers of wood are of course the leskhozy, but
along the chain starting in the forest and ending in the processing industry we find a
number of intermediates, such as harvesting companies. What is interesting here is to
learn to what extent the single firm can obtain the amount of wood it requires
irrespective of who the provider might be. The fact that many firms cannot procure, or
mobilize, resources enough to “buy” a sufficient amount of wood does not change our
analysis. The base line hypothesis should be that there are always possibilities to get
wood if one is willing, and is able, to pay enough. Thus, the perceived shortage of wood
should be regarded as a good reflection of a dysfunction on the demand as well as on
the supply side of the forest market.
From Diagram 7:3 can be concluded that forest users in Arkhangelsk face a larger
shortage of wood than do other Russian forest enterprises, as well as their Swedish
counterparts.
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Diagram 7:3. Wood supply
Asked for the reason for this shortage 10 of 15 Arkhangelsk enterprises refer to
financial problems. The rest attribute the problems to technological, logistical problems
associated with the transition. Thus, it can be concluded that the main obstacle is not
wood supply per se but rather the lack of financial resources to acquire it. This
conclusion is also supported by the fact that only a minor part of the AAC is harvested
(cf. section on “Harvesting” in Chap. 2). It should also be mentioned that around 23
percent of the firms have long term contracts with their suppliers, while 29 percent
acquire their wood as stumpage sales. Remaining firms practice a number of other
solutions.
Sales of Wood
Arkhangelsk is known as an important exporter of forest products. Accordingly, around
42 percent of the firms investigated sell their products on export. This is slightly more
than the other Russian firms in our data set and more than the Swedish firms (cf.
Diagram 7:4).
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Diagram 7:4. Number of forest firms exporting their products
All of the exporting firms sell their products to European customers, two of them in
combination with sales to Asian and North American customers. However, only five
enterprises should be primarily regarded as exporters46, while most firms sell both to
domestic and foreign customers. Of all forest enterprises, 60 percent find their
customers on the regional Russian market, two outside the region and three have a
mixed group of Russian customers.
Investments
The level of investment could be looked upon as an indicator of ongoing restructuring,
but all firms do not have the same incentive to restructure. Those firms that trade their
products mainly through barter should typically have little incentive to invest in new
equipment, etc., while those submitted to a cash economy strive to reduce the “distance”
to the market (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998). One way to accomplish this is to invest to get a
more effective production system.
Given the existence of a rather aged capital stock as well as a general lack of product
development in the forest sector it is striking that only seven (23%) of the 31
Arkhangelsk enterprises invest in their firms. This level is lower than among the other
Russian enterprises. If we compare with Swedish firms, more than 80 percent of which
invest (despite the fact that they probably have already relatively modern equipment),
the difference is strikingly large (Diagram 7:5).
                                                
46
 Total output of lumber from round timber is merely about 52% in any export sawmill in Russia
(Prokof’ev, 1990). About 2/3 of total lumber output might be sold on export. The remaining 1/3 of the
total lumber volume is of such a low quality that it cannot be sold on export. This lumber is sold on the
domestic market or sometimes partly exported to Asian or African countries.
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Diagram 7:5. Number of forest firms making investments
Of the seven firms that do invest only one finances its venture through bank loans. It
should also be noted that among the firms that invest we find that 43 percent are joint
ventures while only 13 percent of the non-investing firms belong to this category. This
corresponds to an observation made by Buiter et al. (1998).
Payments, Banking and Social Responsibility
As been mentioned in previous chapters non-monetary transactions, such as barter, the
use of money surrogates (vekselia), and offsets (zachety) have become more common
during the last five years (cf. Aukutsionek, 1998; Commander & Mumssen, 1998). In
the absence of developed, domestic and foreign markets for wood the cash economy is
relatively small. This fact is reflected in poor interaction between firms and the banking
system, but also in the existence of numerous social responsibilities that are connected
to the ownership of enterprises. The cashless side of this is that various services, such as
housing or child care, could be set off against tax arrears, provision of consumer goods
against wage debts, etc.
In our questionnaire firms were explicitly asked about their relations with the bank
system. It should be noted that only around 20 percent of the Arkhangelsk firms have
any relations to the bank system, compared to Sweden, where almost 80 percent of the
firms employ bank services related to loans, etc. The majority of the Arkhangelsk
enterprises attributed their lack of bank relations to security and trust problems. Only
two of the firms having no contacts explained that the reason was that they had no need
of such relations.
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Around 50 percent of all forest firms in our study, whether from Arkhangelsk or from
the other Russian regions, sell their wood through barter. Since we do not have data
about other forms of non-monetary transactions it is probably fairly safe to assume that
the cash-less economy is larger than 50 percent, and thus in line with data from others
studies (cf. Aukutsionek, 1998). While the majority of the Swedish firms practice a rule
that wood should be paid within 30 days from delivery the payment practice in
Arkhangelsk is dictated by a need to get paid before or in direct connection to the
delivery of goods. Thirteen firms require their customers to pay before they deliver any
goods while eleven practice payment upon delivery.47 Only two of the 31 firms accept
payments after the good has been delivered. The obvious implication for the prospects
of moving towards a market economy is that such a change is hard to accomplish if
most actors secure themselves via the described payment practices. As an obvious result
trade is halted before it can even begin.
Another side of the non-monetary economy is firms’ engagement in the provision of
public goods and services. Thirteen of the 31 Arkhangelsk firms (50% of those who
answered the question) say they provide social services. The  most common
engagement is provision of consumer goods, child care and schooling.
Trust
In a number of studies48 the general lack of trust in the Russian society has been
scrutinized. It has also been noticed that there are significant differences in the existence
of trust among the former east European socialist countries, Poland being one of the
“best” and Russia among the “worst” (Raiser, 1997)49. How might this be reflected in
the behavior of the Arkhangelsk forest firms?
First, the payment practice described above can be attributed to a general lack of trust in
the existing system. Another feature is the lack of trust demonstrated through broken
agreements in commercial relations. As can be seen in Diagram 7:6 around 40 percent
of the Arkhangelsk firms (15) have problems with broken agreements, typically
payment, when they sell their products. However, these problems seem to be less severe
in Arkhangelsk compared to the other Russian regions, but in comparison with western
actors, e.g., the Swedish firms, the lack of trust is striking.
                                                
47
 Note that seven of the 31 firms practice a combination of these two systems, depending on the
anticipated reliability of the customer.
48
 Cf. for instance the studies by Mishler & Rose (1995), Rose et al. (1997) and Mishler & Rose (1998)
based on The New Russia Barometer surveys first undertaken in January/February 1992. This and
subsequent surveys have been published in the University of Strathclyde Centre for the Study of Pulic
Policy series “Studies in Public Policy” (no. 205, 216, 228, 250, 260, 272, 303).
49
 Raiser uses trust in the sense “social trust” (i.e. trust in the existing government and its formal
institutions) and this is found to be low in Russia. Ickes et al. (1997:120) refer to a study (the “World
Value Survey”) in which the level of so-called “interpersonal trust” was found to be “moderately high” in
Russia, in fact on par with Germany.
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Diagram 7:6. Number of forest firms regarding broken agreements an a problem
Problems as Perceived by Forest Firms
In our survey the representatives of the forest firms were asked about obstacles for
running their businesses, as well as what they regarded as the most urgent problem to be
solved in order to make the forest sector more prosperous. They were also asked about
what they believed was the most binding restriction in relation to their own enterprise.
Table 7:1 and Diagram 7:7 show the distribution of the answers to the latter question.
Although it can be assumed that the suggested problems are not mutually excludable –
for example transport problems can be regarded as a financial problem – it can be noted
that only two of the firms mention “finding a market” as the most binding restriction.
Asked specifically of whether they regarded any specific rules or regulations as binding
for their business activities the taxation legislation was most frequently mentioned –
around 30 percent of the Arkhangelsk firms mentioned this as their most severe
obstacle. This indicates that a great deal of what is often labeled “financial problems”
might equally well be attributed to the taxation policy.
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Table 7:1. Problems perceived as the most binding restrictions for the operation of
forest firms in Arkhangelsk.
Perceived problem Number of Firms Percent
Economy/transition disorder 3 9.7
Tax legislation/burden 1 3.2
Forest legislation 1 3.2
Business legislation 3 9.7
Transportation costs 2 6.5
Skill, competence 1 3.2
Enforcement of laws 1 3.2
Financial/lack of capital 11 35.5
Find market 3 9.7
No privilege 1 3.2
No answer 4 12.9
Total 31 100.0
It is also evident that the Arkhangelsk spectrum of problems deviates from that of the
rest of the interviewed firms. While financial problems seem to be pertinent in
Arkhangelsk they are less frequently mentioned by firms in the other Russian regions of
our survey, and not at all referred to in Sweden. It should also be mentioned that while
the forest legislation is regarded as a problem among Swedish enterprises this issue is
mentioned by only one of the 31 interviewed firms in Arkhangelsk. One explanation
may be that problems related to the forest legislation are overshadowed by other,
perceivably more acute problems.
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Diagram 7:7. Problems perceived as the most binding restrictions for operating forest
firms in different regions.
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Insufficiency or inadequacy of technology, machinery and skills are the most frequently
mentioned problems apart from those already discussed above (cf. Diagram 7:8). Of
course this reflects the need of a technical refurbishing of the Russian forest industrial
enterprises as well as generally raising the competence among employees.
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Diagram 7:8. “Are there other problems which you regard as obstacles for a successful
business?”
What Should Be Done?
What can be done then? According to the interviewed firms in Arkhangelsk the existing
taxation policy is the most urgent problem to be solved. Such a change, they believe,
would benefit the forest sector the most. Of equal importance is to ease the financial
situation, i.e., to get better abilities to borrow money. It should be noted that in Sweden
the interviewed firms also regard taxation as a problem, but not, however, as the most
urgent one. On the other hand, none of the Swedish firms insisted that banking policy
ought to change. Likewise, a suggestion that is obviously not mentioned among the
Swedish firms, is the option of reversing privatization, i.e., to make firms state owned
again. This is the third most common suggestion in Arkhangelsk (Diagram 7:9).
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Diagram 7:9. The most urgent issues to be focused in order to make the forest sector
more efficient
One obvious conclusion, which is also supported in previous chapters, is that the
problems are mixed and intertwined. No single change could solve the problems as they
are perceived by business leader, managers, and others. For example, one of the main
reasons for the poor contacts with the bank system is simply that the value of assets of
the forest firms is too low to serve as collateral for loans, something that affects
investments, which, in turn, delays the restructuring of the forest enterprise sector, etc.
This is discussed more thoroughly in the concluding chapter. Finally, it is also obvious
that some of the business leaders, who supposedly would be the forerunners towards a
market economy still wish they were operating under the old system.
Summary:
The result of the interviews with the Arkhangelsk forest firms are summarized below. It
should be remembered, however, that all comparisons and statements made refer to the
interviewed enterprises, which do not constitute a proper statistical sample.
• During the last five years production in the forest firms has dropped significantly
more than employment. This indicates that productivity is still to be treated as an
urgent issue.
Important changes in Russian forest sector
Other
State
 coordination
Becom
e
 public again
Loans/rents/finance
Law/legisl enforcm
en
Invest/legisl/ethics
Ethics/W
orkdisciplin
Investment/technolog
Business legisl
Forest legisl
Tax system
Pe
rc
e
n
t
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Region
Archkangelsk
Russia
Sweden
72
• Only a minor part of the firms invest. Investments are more uncommon in
Arkhangelsk than among the other Russian forest firms in our study. Joint ventures
with foreign owners raise the likelihood of investment.
• Most firms have poor contacts with the bank system. Investments, for example, are
rarely financed with bank loans.
• Due to financial, and, to a minor extent, to technological circumstances, around half
of the firm experience a shortage of wood.
• Compared to other Russian forest enterprises, the Arkhangelsk firms more often
export their goods.
• Non-monetary transactions, such as barter, is a significant feature of the forest
sector. This is also coupled to the relatively common practice of provision of social
services.
• Compared to Swedish forest firms the lack of reliability, in terms of broken
agreements in sales transactions, is striking. This provides a source of deadlock in
trade demonstrated by the fact that all parties to a trade transaction want to be paid
in advance.
• The problem of finding markets is perceived as a minor problem in comparison with
more urgent issues, such as the financial situation and the taxation system.
• The majority of the firms suggest that the most urgent tasks for government to
handle are a change in the taxation system and provision of better opportunities to
get bank credits.
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8. Conclusion and Recommendations
The first task for this final chapter is to conclude to what extent the criteria launched in
the first chapter are met in Arkhangelsk, i.e., to assess how close to market conditions
the forest sector has moved.
• Constitutional rules are acknowledged and transparent?
In terms of constitutional clearness the situation in Arkhangelsk is similar to other
Russian regions (cf. Carlsson & Olsson, 1998; Sheingauz et al., 1995). It is evident that
a number of constitutional problems concern the forest sector. Some rules of the
Russian constitution are contradictory. Consequently, the constitution itself is a source
of uncertainty and confusion and subsequent rules add more confusion to the picture.
The constitution might be acknowledged but different actors emphasize different
qualities of it. For example, those who plead for a privatization of the forests as well as
those who oppose such a policy can find support for their views in the constitution.
• The structure of property rights is settled and well defined, i.e., private actors can
acquire property or get the right to utilize property for their own benefit?
As in most other parts of Russia the property rights issue is not settled in Arkhangelsk
either. Two separate state “bodies,” the Russian Federation and the regions, are the legal
owners of the forests. These bodies often pursue different goals. The dispute on who has
the responsibility to clean up Novaya Zemlya, the oblast or the federal authorities, is a
good illustration of these problems with unclear responsibilities. Property rights is not
the same as ownership. Rather it is a matter of establishing clear and transparent
relations among actors in relation to, in this case, the forest resources. Even if land
acquisition is not allowed, private actors do have the right to utilize forest lands.
However there are many barriers to overcome. Certain users enjoy special privileges,
information is scarce and often of bad quality. Consequently, there exist big problems to
attract foreign investors. It may also be questioned whether all recently privatized
lespromkhozy, for example, really fulfil the criteria of being “private.” Nevertheless it
can be concluded that private actors do have the right to utilize property for their own
benefit even if these rights are circumvented through excessive regulations, of which
inappropriate harvesting rules is one example and taxation rules another.
• Rules and regulations from official authorities are regarded as legitimate, and
apply equally to similar actors?
In Arkhangelsk, as in many other Russian regions, rules and regulations do not apply
equally to similar actors. Negotiations and special agreements with the authorities are a
legacy from the past and are still making a clear impact on business behavior. The
heavy emphasis on barter and other non-monetary transactions is an indication of this.
Nor do our findings support the conclusion that official rules are regarded as legitimate.
Taxation is the most apparent example of an area of regulation for which there is poor
legitimacy and a low degree of compliance. In fact, it is likely that, even if a manager
would have the intention to obey all rules his firm is supposed to follow, taxation
included,  it would simply not be possible to do so.
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• The market decides prices of property and goods?
Market mechanisms are weak and the price of forest products neither reflects costs of
production nor actual demand. Taking the wide-spread barter system and the existence
of its quasi-money into account it is easily realized that the pricing of many forest
products is far from being decided in genuinely competitive markets. It might seem like
paradoxes that there exists a shortage of timber and that few enterprises (in our sample)
regard finding a market as a major problem. The reasons are financial, basically a
reflection of the absence of a competitive market. However, we should acknowledge
that since Arkhangelsk is still a big exporter of wood we can conclude that the price
mechanism works in certain market segments, while it is still weak in other, especially
in a large part of the domestic market where behavior is constrained by political
administrative interferences.
• Decision-making regarding collective choice and operational rules is
decentralized?
As we have seen, the Federal Forest Service, which has a uniform administrative system
all over Russia, even in detail regulates forest operations. On the other hand, the
creation of the regional anti-crisis program and the rule-making regarding leasing and
stumpage fees are two examples of decentralized decision making. A similar logic
applies to environmental regulations; regional authorities can make rules if decisions of
federal law allow them to do so or if such rules are absent. However, in many respects
the forest sector is still heavily centralized and there is virtually no popular participation
in decision making affecting the development of the sector. For example, the local
forest lobby, exert great influence in the Duma as well as in the bureaucracy.  At the
genuinely local level public participation is very rudimentary.
It can also be concluded that the old patterns of centralization have been re-
institutionalized. The structure and function of, for example, the Union of Forest
Industrialists supports this conclusion. However, in Arkhangelsk forest exporters have
developed their own organizations that are not (entirely) in the hands of Moscow based
brokers, etc.
• Private investors can realize the returns on their investments?
Private investors may have the legal right to realize the returns of their investments, but
since political risks are relatively high, they have very limited possibilities to insure
themselves for business failures. As our data show the general investment level is very
low, bank contacts are poor, etc. It is also evident that the taxation system not only
induce actors to hide income but also abstain them from transferring money to Russian
banks.50 The conclusion is that the political authorities have not yet succeeded to
                                                
50
 Based on own experiences in running this research project we know that a foreign “investor” intending
to transfer money to a bank account in Arkhangelsk might be charged 75% in different types of fees, etc.
We have also learned that any transfer of larger sums, albeit intended to be used for investment in local
enterprises, increases the likelihood that one attracts criminal groups as well as bureaucrats having an
incentive to find ways of fining the firm. Retroactive rule making in relations to custom fees is a third
example of practices that definitely deter foreign investors to operate in Arkhangelsk.
75
minimize or eliminate political risks as a means of achieving economic growth. In
principle, private investors should be able to realize the returns on their investments but
the generally low profitability in the Arkhangelsk forest sector indicates that the
likelihood that they will actually enter the market and do so is low.
• Rules are enacted aimed at preventing the devastation of natural resources?
The institutional features of the legacy of overuse still govern many activities in the
forest sector of Arkhangelsk. In fact, one can suspect that the main reason why the
devastation is not even more severe is the economic crisis and the subsequently low
levels of harvesting. Rules are, however, enacted to prevent devastation of the forests in
the region. This is primarily done through the new forest code and its subsequent
environmental legislation. Environmental groups and others argue that the new forest
code is weakening the protection of the environment. For example, the clause
forbidding timber operations in threatened and endangered habitats has been taken away
in the new forest code of 1997. It is also obvious that the new forest code contradicts
other environmental laws, such as the law on wildlife protection. 51
• Legitimate authorities take measures against violations of rules?
Rules-in-use are those rules that are in fact sanctioned; otherwise they would just be
words on paper. Consequently, even “bad” rules and informal rules may be sanctioned.
The rules of barter are one example of a system of rules that by no means is formally
codified but which nevertheless is sanctioned. As for the sanctioning of rules of law
applying to the Arkhangelsk forest sector it is a well-known fact that violations of rules
are common and tolerated. A related behavior is the “zero-sum” practice used  in
relation to the fulfillment of AAC, namely, that local over-cutting can be “evened out”
by under-cutting in other areas. Another example is the practice of concealing
substantial changes in the species composition by stretching the definition of what is to
be regarded as a “coniferous stand.” The basic problem, however, is not the actual
wording of the rules and regulations but rather the inability to implement them.
Obviously the Federal Forest Service lacks means both to monitor and to sanction the
behavior of the actors. The new financial solution giving leskhozy more of the revenue
from forest operations will presumably improve the situation.
In our interviews we found that there are a general lack of “third party” solutions in the
forest sector; at the same time as the breaking of agreements is regarded a significant
problem virtually nothing happens if one breaks them, e.g., if one does not pay for
delivered goods. This is also the case for the sanctioning of the taxation rules.
                                                
51
 Environmental groups are very active in discussing Russian forestry and related topics. For example,
independent “environmentalists” have formed a “Forest Club” consisting of a broad spectrum of groups
but also bureaucracies, such as Greenpeace Russia, The Socio-Ecological Union, the Kola Center of
Biodiversity, the International University of Ecology and Politology, and others. The Forest Club is
currently running a campaign in the northern part of European Russia focussing on certification, the
establishment of conservation areas, fund raising for local ENVOs, support of new technology,
information to the Regional Forest Management, distribution of information from Sweden and Finland
about forest maintenance practices and the moratorium on harvesting in certain forests that foreign timber
buyers now support in Russian Karelia (interview with representatives of the Forest Club in Arkhangelsk,
October 1997). For opinions about contradicting laws etc., see e.g. Olsson, 1997.
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According to a survey conducted within the framework of the New Russian Barometer
(Rose et al., 1998: 16 ff.) 56 percent of the population are of the opinion that there is no
need to pay taxes if you do not want to do so. If caught, 27 percent think the problem
could be solved by paying bribes. Our investigation does not indicate that the situation
would be different in Arkhangelsk. The general conclusion is that in many important
respects the authorities have to consider a whole range of problems whenever they want
(or if they want) to take measures against the violation of rules. For example, the rules
of harvesting that in practice prevent the introduction of a new and environmentally
friendly technology is one example of sanctioning of the “wrong” rules. The weird
taxation system might serve as another example of this kind of mistaken rule
sanctioning. Thus, the problem does not only concern the sanctioning capability but also
the rules themselves.
The Nested Character of the Problems
Based on our investigation there are no reasons to believe that the qualities of the
institutional framework of the forest sector in Arkhangelsk is significantly different than
in other parts of the federation. As in other regions there has been a dramatic downfall
in production and harvesting. Almost half a million people in the Oblast are directly
dependent on the forest sector and although forests are abundant there is still a shortage
of wood for larger industries. In fact, today there exists some kind of battle among
enterprises for good providers. This, however, does not reflect any market type of
competition which presumably would have risen prices. Instead, the main feature of the
“battle” is the prospects of establishing good relations and special agreements based on
non monetary transactions, and so forth.
The institutional shortcomings of the forest sector have a nested character, in which
different features are reinforcing each other. Many firms are trapped in a number of
vicious circles creating a kind of institutional “deadlock” in the sector. One example is
harvesting. Since harvesting is seasonal so are deliveries of timber. However, most
actors cannot wait for payments and as money is required instantly in order to invest or
to pay for wages and goods, this practice causes other problems in subsequent links to
the end user. (For an illustration of the nested character of the problems, see Figure 8:1.)
Another example is banking. A renewal of the forest sector requires investments but all
investments must be financed. There are possibilities to borrow money but all
commercial banks lend money on security. Since the assets of the firms often have a
limited market value, no money could be borrowed in banks, and, since no money could
be borrowed the necessary restructuring has to wait. As a result firms are trapped in the
logic of the present “negotiated economy” making them unable to modernize production
and thus to create the assets that would be needed in the first place.
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Figure 8:1. The action arena of Russian forest management, relations between
factors affecting harvesting.(Source Carlsson & Olsson, 1998:53)
The situation in the Arkhangelsk forest sector can be summarized as follows:
• With its traditionally strong emphasis on export the forest sector has good potential
for being one of the driving forces in the economic development. However, a
number of institutional factors raise hurdles for such a progress. The main problem
is not to find customers but rather to create a “critical mass” of functional and
reliable relations with the potential customers. The same goes for other central
commercial (nota bene) actors in the sector; “good” relations with non-commercial
structures seem already to exist.
• The forest sector is characterized by a notable “personnel union,” something that
raises questions about the possibilities for a successful restructuring of the sector.
Actors that are supposed to lead the restructuring may, in fact, constitute hurdles for
its realization.
• The existing ambiguities in the legislation, in combination with the high levels of
taxes, weird pricing and an absence of adequate transportation policies severely
affect the enterprises’ ability to benefit from and to become successful actors in the
still rudimentary markets.
• Due to a general lack of transparency in the forest sector political risks are
significant. This creates a hesitant behavior among foreign as well as domestic
investors.
The Action Arena of
Forest Management
RULES-IN-USE
• Constitutional stipulations, for example, regarding
property rights, and the formal legitimacy of
decision bodies.
• Stipulations of federal and regional forest codes
• Management and other decisions made by the
Federal Forest Service, leskhozy, lespromkhozy,
banks, and others.
• Rules of forest management planningPHYSICAL FACTORS
• Climate and topography
• The quantity and quality of the
forests
• Distribution of forests
SOCIAL FACTORS
• A collectivist culture, “systemocentric” norms and
ethic
• Education profile of the personnel
• The dominance of Soviet type management skills
• Low wages driving experts from the forest sector
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• The forest sector is organized in a way that promotes a type of enterprise behavior
that aims at expanding one enterprise’s control over actors adjacent to its position in
the forest-to-market chain. This has to do with uncertain property rights ultimately
leading to a general inability to capture the benefits of division of labor and
specialization.
Business Behavior in a Virtual Economy
Much of the data that has been presented in this report give evidence for the conclusion
that only a rudimentary restructuring of the forest sector has taken place in Arkhangelsk.
The production apparatus is too old, management too inefficient and questions can be
made about the skills of the personnel indicating a significant lack of well-trained
executives. Thus, some argue that the explanation of the “lack of money” in the forest
sector should mainly be blamed on bad management. This argument might have some
merits but it might as well confuse us regarding the institutional aspects of the problem.
In order to understand some of these institutional hurdles one must start from the
assumption that individuals act in rational way, under given circumstances. Thus, with
Gaddy and Ickes (1998:1), we assume “that managers are rational and that the
environment induces them to postpone (avoid) restructuring”. This is the basic idea
behind Gaddy’s and Ickes’ work on the ”virtual economy.” The theory goes as follows.
The managers of Russian enterprises have strong incentives to continue to run their
businesses independently of their profitability. The social responsibilities associated
with running firms are part of the explanation. Our investigations, as well as other
studies, show that barter, tax offsets and other non-monetary solutions are common
features in the so called trade. Thus, firms can continue to produce although the
outcome of the activities are paid with other means than cash. Such a production is
aimed at generating “soft” goods that can only be traded in “quasi-markets” rather than
in commercial markets. Why then do managers avoid restructuring?
Most firms have a substantial distance to travel before they can meet the conditions of
competitive markets of wood. The first option would be to invest to make production
more effective, but, as we have discussed above, this solution has its own problems. The
other option is to invest in “relational capital”, e.g., perform services for the local
authorities etc. (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998:9 ff.). Thus, the more fraternizing with
bureaucrats, the more tax offsets, privileges etc. one can obtain the more investments
are made in this kind of capital. Moreover, given the fact that the distance to
competitiveness is in most cases significant such “investments” are cheaper and, thus,
preferred. These circumstances have the nasty effect that we cannot, in fact, conclude
that an enterprise that shows relatively high production volumes is more successful than
a similar enterprise producing smaller volumes. It might as well be a “value destructor”
and a producer of “soft” goods still having a long “distance” to travel before it can
survive in a competitive market.
Consequently, whether forest firms chose to invest in relational or physical capital
depends on the initial (inherited) stock of such capital in their possession. The managers
will simply prefer the type of investment that is cheaper and it is obvious that the Soviet
type of integrated forest industrial system (that was inherited in 1991) provides a rich
fund of relational capital to profit from. With reference to Tables 7:1 and 7:2 it can be
concluded that the main part of the forest firms still operate in the “virtual economy
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square” of the matrix. It has also been indicated that joint venture enterprises, which can
be assumed to work under a different logic, invest more than other firms relying more
on relational capital. Given that the situation in Arkhangelsk is as we describe it, what
can be done in order to redirect the ship towards the open market?
Recommendations
If, as we have discussed, there exits a trade-off between investment in relational or
physical capital the aim of the authorities should block the ways to the cornucopias of
the political-administrative system. Following the same logic, of the existence of a trade
off between the two types of investments, undertakings that solely promote investment
might as well have the effect that more soft goods are produced. Igor’s four principles
of management planning in a virtual economy, borrowed from Gaddy and Ickes
(1998:13), underpins this point:
1. Have some percentage of your sales to the federal government. Ideally, at
about the level of your estimated federal taxes. You know you will not be paid
for these sales, but you use it for offset taxes.
2. Export something to a paying, hard currency market. You need some cash for
your operations, mainly for urgently needed inputs. Export may not be of your
major product.
3. Set up some barter operations for the rest of your inputs, especially fuels,
electricity and so on. It is best if you have some products that utilities need.
Then they will pay you in vekselya that you can redeem for the inputs.
4. Have the capability to provide municipal services so that you can offset local
taxes. An ideal method is to have a construction division that can fix schools,
etc.
It is evident that these principles to a lesser extent apply to small private enterprises.
The policy advise should be to promote these types of firms by making it easier for
them to invest and operate. The guiding principle should be a conscious stimulation of a
structure of actors who benefit from the existence of an open and transparent system of
rules rather than from obscure informalities or even corruption. Smaller firms have this
quality to a greater extent than large, old state enterprises.
This does not mean that authorities should abandon large industries. It rather means that
engagements should be transparent and part of a plan outlining the future of these
plants. Shock therapy will not work in communities totally dependent on single
enterprises. One problem with many of the thinkable measures for improving the
situation is that they presuppose the existence of an already well functioning
institutional framework. This is the crucial problem. Having this in mind we
recommend the following:
• Regional authorities and others should withdraw from most of their engagements in
single firms. When such engagements are needed the reasons should be openly
declared and justified.
• The overall task of political authorities in Arkhangelsk should be to minimize or
eliminate political risks in order to achieve economic growth. For example, all types
of ad hoc regulations, such as retroactive rule-making, should be immediately
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stopped. Politicians and related officials should promote institutional stability and,
thus, transparency of rules, which will subsequently increase predictability.
• In order to stimulate, or increase the likelihood of, the evolvement of “real” branch
organizations officials should withdraw  from the type of corporativist organizations
that has been created.
• The authorities should pay great attention to the task of making regulations more
simple and contradictions between various rules should, if possible, be eliminated.
• Together with other actors regional authorities should develop programs in order to
stop the deterioration of education and to increase management competence in the
forest sector.
• Activities of independent actors should be encouraged and supported, thereby
counteracting a further bureaucratization of the forest sector. For example, programs
deliberately aimed at stimulating the establishment and development of small and
medium sized enterprises should be constructed, provision of economic guarantees
should be considered as well as economic support of entrepreneurship.
• All private actors in the forest sector as well as the regional authorities must find
ways of releasing industries from their social commitments. For example,
privatization of apartments should be increased and supported.
• All concerned parties should try to find economic support for deliberate programs
aimed at renovating apartment houses, repairing public buildings, roads, and other
infrastructure facilities. As a side effect this might increase the regional demand of
forest products.
• More emphasis should be paid to develop the export sector, for example, by
widening the current range of products. Political authorities as well as the authority
of the police should be used to secure that exporting firms have the possibility to
reinvest the income of their export thereby making their production more efficient.
Export firms have no incentive to generate money that in the end will end up in a
draconian tax system or in the hands of organized crime.
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Appendices
Appendix 1:1
Case Study Instruction
What data should be compiled about public authorities and
organizations relating to the region’s forest sector?
This “Case Study Instruction” is one of a number of instruments used in the
collection of data in the IIASA project studying the institutional aspects of
the Russian forest sector. The data compilation in the part of our study that
concerns public authorities, organizations, etc. should be guided by the
questions listed in this document. (To illustrate what kind of information we
consider important and interesting we have separately listed a number of
comments to the questions.)
Information provided with the help of this instruction should be based on
the knowledge of the study’s regional coordinator, but it should also (as far
as possible) be based on official sources as well as on the knowledge and
opinions of individuals (public officials, experts) contacted in the course of
the study. All sources used should be explicitly recorded. The guiding
principle is that it should be possible for a critical person to control the basis
of our reports.
Much of the information we need about specific regions might be retrieved
from the extensive project database situated at IIASA. Only data which is
not readily available at IIASA is compiled through this field work.
Questions relating to this instruction should be addressed to:
Lars Carlsson <carlsson@iiasa.ac.at>
and/or
Mats-Olov Olsson <olsson@iiasa.ac.at>
or via telefax: +43 2236 71313
88
Questions to guide the data collection on the structure of
the forest sector, public authorities and organizations
in a specific region
1. What does the region’s forest sector look like in relation to other sectors in the
economy? Describe its position and development.
2. How is the forest sector organized in terms of public authorities and
organizations?
3. What is the enterprise structure in the region’s forest sector?
4. What other organizations exist in the region which are related to the forest sector?
What are their duties and what principles govern their interactions with other
organizational structures?
5. What are the most central features of the federal and regional legislation that
applies to the forest sector in the region?
6. According to qualified assessments, which components of the forest sector
regulations cause most problems for the region today? Why? What changes in the
forest legislation are considered necessary in order to make it work more
efficiently?
7. To what extent do the various organizations that you have discussed in questions
1-6 currently function in accordance with official intentions?
8. Considering the organizations discussed above, to what extent do leading
representatives hold positions in several organizations? Where (by whom) are the
most important decisions relating to the activity of these organizations taken?
9. What is the political structure in the region?
10. What aspects have been insufficiently covered in the answers to the earlier
questions?
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Appendix 1:2
Questions form used in the interviews with the Russian
forest sector enterprises
Interview no.
Interview conducted by: 
Date:
Name and address of enterprise:
Respondent:
SECTION A: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTERPRISE  
1. Name of the enterprise?
2. What year was the enterprise established?
3. Give a short description of the enterprise.
4. Type of enterprise?
Forest owner/possessor/forest service
Harvesting enterprise
Processing industry
Consultant
Other type, describe
5. What are your main products?
Today:
One year ago:
5 years ago:
10 years ago:
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6. What is the actual production volume of the enterprise?
Today:
One year ago:
5 years ago:
10 years ago:
7. Who is the legal owner of this enterprise?
The state, specify:
Private person/persons, namely:
The enterprise is a corporation
  owned by other companies, namely:
Other, namely:
8. Number of employees? (Counted as full time personnel)
Workers, today: 
Workers, 5 years ago: 
Workers, 10 years ago:
Administration, now: 
Administration, 5 years ago: 
Administration, 10 years ago:
9. Do you have any engagements and responsibilities related to activities other than
“production”?
Housing.
Provision of consumer goods:
Schools:
Health care:
Child care:
Other:
10. Do you currently make any investments in your enterprise?
No
Yes, describe content and scale
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11. How are your relations to the ”banking system” – can you borrow money, from
whom and on what terms? Describe:
SECTION B: INPUT SIDE OF THE ENTERPRISE  
12. From whom do you acquire timber/wood?
Provider:                                                                                          % of total volume:
Provider 1:
Provider 2:
etc.
13. On what terms is the timber/wood normally acquired?
FOR CONSULTACY FIRMS:
12 b. From whom do you get your orders/tasks/assignments?
Client:                                                                                            % of total volume:
Client 1:
Client 2:
etc.
13b. On what terms do you get your orders/tasks/assignments? Describe:
14. Do you have any alternative supplier(s)?
Yes
No
15. Can you acquire a sufficient amount?
Yes
No, what is the explanation?
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16. How is the timber/wood paid for?
Payment upon delivery:
Payment before delivery:
Other arrangement, namely:
17. How are payments arranged?
Via bank; name of bank:
Payments are done by the enterprise itself:
Other construction, namely:
18. What will happen if either part breaks the agreement or does not fulfill its
duties?
19. Do you regard violations of agreements as a problem?
Yes, a big problem
Yes, but a small problem
Not really a problem
20. Describe how a typical purchase transaction is performed.
SECTION C: OUTPUT SIDE OF THE ENTERPRISE  
21. To whom do you sell your ‘products’?  Name and type of customers in order of
importance (as a percentage of total volume), name all.
Customer:                                                                                        % of total volume:
Customer 1:
  Type:
Customer 2:
  Type:
etc.
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22. Can you describe how a typical sales transaction is performed?
23. What will happen if either part breaks the agreement or does not fulfill its
duties? Describe
24. Do you regard violations of agreements as a problem?
Yes, a big problem
Yes, but a small problem
Not really a problem
25. How do you get paid for your products?
Cash or equivalent upon delivery
Cash or equivalent paid before delivery
Other arrangement, namely: 
26. How are payments arranged?
Via bank; name of this bank:
Payments are done by the enterprise itself
Other construction, namely: 
SECTION D: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS  
27. Is this enterprise member of any branch organization or equivalent?
No
Yes, namely:
What are the arguments for this construction?
28. Are there rules or regulations that apply to your enterprise which you regard
as an obstacle for your activities?
No
Yes, describe: 
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29. Are there other problems which you regard as obstacles for a successful
business? Describe
No, only minor:
machinery/technology:
equipment/supply/maintenance:
personnel/skill/competence:
other:
30. What is the single most binding ”restriction” on the activity of your enterprise?
Describe
31. Generally speaking, do you find the formal legislation regulating Russian forest
enterprises adequate and efficient?
Yes
No, explain why.
32. If it would be possible to change anything related to the Russian forest sector,
what would you change?
33. Other comments of relevance?
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Appendix 3:1
Table:3.4. Selected socioeconomic variables for Arkhangelsk compared with the
average for the Russian Federation and the other subjects of the Northern Region, 1993
and 1996.
Russia
Arkh-
an-
gelsk
Kare-
lia Komi
Volog-
da
Mur-
mansk
Income below subsistence, % of househ. 28 14 14 18 30 10
Non-state enterprises, % of all 91 80 83 69 89 85
Share of privatized apartments, % of all 32 18 22 21 26 32
State employees, % of all 28 39 18 29 5 16
Library attendants per 100 inhabitants 41 37 45 35 44 50
University students per 1,000 inhabitants 17 10 12 9 13 6
Female students per 1,000 inhabitants 9 5 8 5 8 3
Female students, % of all students 52 53 62 58 61 48
Number of students per lecturer 11 11 9 12 12 13
Researchers per 10,000 inhabitants 113 19 56 30 23 55
PhDs (Dr nauk) per 100,000 inhabitants 11 0.6 3.0 3.0 0.3 4
PhDs (Kand nauk) per 100,000 inhabitants 80 12 40 27 4 40
Savings mill. R. per 1,000 inhabitants 27 17 14 31 17 45
Alcohol consumption, liter per inhabitant 6.0 4.8 7.7 5.1 8.7 5.1
Private cars per 1,000 inhabitants 75 51 89 58 50 93
Housing space per inhabitant, m2 12 12 12 11 13 10
Urban households with running water % 83 74 83 91 82 98
Rural households with running water % 30 11 20 16 21 75
Physicians per 10,000 inhabitants 45 45 48 40 34 47
Alcoholism patients per 100,000 inh. 1657 1866 2271 1511 1390 1496
Drug addiction patients per 100,000 inh. 31 6 22 12 10 6
Cancer patients per 100,000 inhabitants 1209 970 1116 723 1233 735
Sick-days per 100 employees 903 945 1113 1068 986 965
Sportsmen per 1,000 inhabitants 77 84 109 122 60 89
No. of sport establishments per 10,000 inh. 14 15 16 14 13 6
Source: IIASA forest database, Rows 1-4 from Bradshaw & Palacin, 1996.
